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INTRODUCTION

There are more prisoners in the United States today than at any
time in our nation's history.' Since 1980, the number of persons
imprisoned in federal and state correctional facilities has more than
doubled.2 Additionally, the percentage of the nation's residents in3
carcerated for more than one year is currently at an all-time high.
It is not surprising, therefore, that prisons across the country are
overcrowded 4-overcrowded to the point of creating conditions
1. The combined federal and state prison population reached a record high of 771,243
at the end of 1990. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1990 1 (1991) [hereinafter
PRISONERS IN 1990]. The federal and state prisons added 58,686 inmates in 1990, up 8.2%
from 1989. IA
2. The total number of prisoners in state and federal institutions rose from 329,821 in
1980 to 771,243 in 1990, an increase of nearly 134% in the ten-year period. Id The population in federal prisons alone nearly doubled from October 1980 to May 1989, growing from
24,162 to 48,017 inmates. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT
TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE NATION'S PRISON SYS-

9 (1989) [hereinafter GAO, PRISON CROWDING]. This sharp increase is even more startling when compared to the fact that from 1950 to 1980 the federal prison population grew by
less than 40%. IL
3. The number of sentenced prisoners-meaning sentences of more than one yearper 100,000 residents was 293 at the 1990 year-end, a record-high rate of incarceration. PRISONERS IN 1990, supra note 1, at 2. In 1980, the rate of incarceration was 139 sentenced prisoners per 100,000 residents. Id Thus, the rate of incarceration has increased 11 1% since 1980.

TEMS

Id
4. At the end of 1990, prisons nationwide were estimated to be operating from 18% to
29% over capacity. Id. at 6. In Massachusetts, the state prisons were operating at 173% of
their capacity at the end of March 1991, prompting state officials to consider using a ship as a
floating prison to house 600-800 inmates. State ConsideringBuilding Prison Ship, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1991, at A6.
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that violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment.5 Indeed, as ofJanuary 1, 1992, sixty-six percent of the
nation's jurisdictions had their entire prison systems or major institutions therein under court order or consent decree to alleviate
6
overcrowded prison conditions.
The growth in the prison population can be attributed in part to
the nationwide crackdown on crime that occurred in the 1970s and
1980s. 7 This crackdown has been highlighted by congressional and
state increases in mandatory sentencing guidelines 8 and Supreme
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
6. The court orders or consent decrees apply to major institutions in 24 out of53jurisdictions (50 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) in the
United States. THE NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, STATUS REPORT: STATE PRISONS AND THE COURTS (JANUARY 1, 1992). These ju-

risdictions are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia. Id. Additionally, I out of 53 jurisdictions had their entire prison systems under court order or consent decree as ofJanuary 1, 1992. Id. These jurisdictions are
Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Id. Thus, as ofJanuary 1, 1992, 35 out of 53
jurisdictions (66%) were affected by court order or consent decree to alleviate overcrowded
prison conditions. Id
7. In a 1990 publication, the Bureau ofJustice Statistics reported that "[t]here is some
evidence that during the period 1980-89 changes in criminal justice policies have increased a
criminal's probability of being incarcerated from levels existing in prior years." PRISONERS IN
1990, supra note 1, at 7. The Bureau supported this proposition by tracking the number of
prison commitments resulting from reports of crimes from 1970 to the present. The serious
crimes of murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary accounted for approximately one-half of prison commitments from courts. Id. In 1970,
23 prison commitments resulted per 1000 of these crimes reported to law enforcement agencies. Id In 1980, this number increased to 25 commitments per 1000 reported serious
crimes, and by 1989, the number had soared to 62 commitments per 1000 reported serious
crimes, an increase of 148% since 1980. Id. Likewise, in 1970, 170 prison commitments
resulted for every 1000 adults arrested for the above-listed crimes. Id. In 1980, this number
increased to 196 prison commitments per 1000 adult arrests for serious crimes. Id. By 1989,
the number had soared to 332 commitments per 1000 adult arrests for serious crimes, an
increase of nearly 70% since 1980. Id.; see also GAO, PRISON CROWDING, supra note 2, at 3
(1989) ("Reasons for the growth in prison population include the trend toward mandatory
prison sentences for more criminals, longer prison sentences, and more arrests for drug law
violations.").
8. See The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3580 (1991)) (creating and charging United States Sentencing Commission with development of federal sentencing guidelines, requiring federal courts
to adhere to promulgated guidelines, and abolishing parole for those convicted after guidelines become effective); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1991) (establishing minimum mandatory sentences for variety of federal
offenses). State legislatures were also active in this period enacting mandatory prison sentencing laws. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 71 (1983) (noting that between 1975 and 1982 more than
35 states enacted statutes requiring minimum terms of incarceration for specific crimes). A
number of commentators have argued that the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines have
contributed to the prison overcrowding problem. SeeJeff Bleich, The Politicsof Prison Crowding,
77 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1147 (1989) (observing that primary source of prison population increase during late 1970s and early 1980s was dramatic change in criminal justice policies that
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Court decisions granting those in the criminal justice system greater
freedom to investigate and convict criminals. 9 The crackdown on
crime in the last two decades translates into the growth of prison
populations in the 1990s and beyond. 10 With this growth, the
problems of poor prison conditions caused by overcrowding are
poised for further aggravation, and the personal safety and health of
prison inmates are at risk.
In Wilson v. Seiter, I the Supreme Court added an interesting twist
to this troublesome situation. The Court held that to challenge successfully poor-prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment, two
requirements must be met. First, the conditions must deprive an
inmate of an "identifiable human need,"' 12 and second, the officials
responsible for the conditions must be "deliberately indifferent" to
the inmate's needs.' 3 Thus the proper analysis of Eighth Amendment challenges to prison conditions under Wilson involves an objective and a subjective component: the conditions must be
objectively severe, and the officials responsible for the conditions
must be subjectively culpable.
With this formulation, the Court articulated for the first time a
state-of-mind requirement for establishing that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. It is no longer enough for a prisoner
to demonstrate that he is confined in squalor. He must prove the
squalor to be the product of a "deliberately indifferent" official.
mandated incarceration for various offenses and imposed lengthy sentences for various federal offenses); Theresa W. Kale & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
CongressionalGoals?: An Empiricaland Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 444 (1991) (con-

cluding that guidelines have exacerbated prison overcrowding); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The
Death of Discretion?: Reflections on the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938, 1954-

55 (1988) (asserting that Sentencing Commission was aware guidelines would increase prison
population but failed to propose solution to problem).
9. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (finding that confession
must be obtained by coercive police activity to be involuntary and thus violate due process of
law); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) (limiting exclusionary rule by creating good faith exception); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (abandoning two-pronged Aguilar and Spinelli test and holding that probable cause for Fourth Amendment search
and seizures may be based on totality of circumstances).
10. The expansion plans of the Bureau of Prisons are to operate in 1995 at 30% over
capacity for an estimated 83,500 federal prisoners. GAO, PRISON CROWDING, supra note 2, at
15-17. Revised planning figures have estimated the federal prison population in 1995 to be
95,000. Id. at 17. If expansion of facilities is not planned to meet this higher estimate, the
federal prisons will be operating at 48% over capacity in 1995. Id. The United States Sentencing Commission estimates that the federal prison population will be between 116,000 and
147,000 inmates by the year 2002. Id. at 15.
11. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
12. Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S.Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991); see infra text accompanying notes 12531 (discussing Court's reasoning in holding that prisoners must prove under Eighth Amendment that they have been deprived of identifiable human need).
13. Wilson, 111 8.Ct. at 2327; see infra text accompanying notes 93-121 (discussing
Court's derivation of state-of-mind requirement and deliberate indifference standard).
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Furthermore, the Court restricted the objective component of
Eighth Amendment challenges by holding that conditions are unconstitutionally severe only when they deprive an inmate of an identifiable human need. It is no longer enough that overall prison
conditions are harsh. 14 The conditions must now be shown to deprive an inmate of a need such as food, warmth, or exercise.15
These new requirements create a volatile situation. At the same
time that large prison populations and elevated rates of incarceration are exacerbating prison conditions around the nation, 16 the
Supreme Court has made it more difficult for inmates to challenge
successfully poor prison conditions on Eighth Amendment
grounds. 17 This combination of events places the basic human
14. See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text (discussing different tests courts have
applied to evaluate severity of conditions).
15. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327. It should be noted that state prisoners may seek relief
from poor prison conditions under state law. Possibilities for such relief include habeas
corpus actions, constitutional claims, tort actions, actions for injunctive relief, and actions for
declaratory judgments. See HAZEL B. KERPER &JANEEN KERPER, LEGAL RiGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 321-45 (1974) (listing and discussing mechanics of prisoners' suits under state law); see

also Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damagesfor State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1269,
1275-88 (1985) (discussing possible actions for violations of state constitutional rights); SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PIUSONERS' RIGHTs 563-76 (3d ed. 1986) (summarizing possible state remedies for prisoners). Massachusetts has a civil rights law that
provides relief similar to that of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under federal law. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 12, §§ I1-H to -I (West 1991); see Friesen, supra, at 1285-87 (discussing applications of
Massachusetts statute); see also infra note 81 (providing explanation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Obtaining effective relief under state law, however, is problematic. For instance, when prisoners
challenge harsh prison conditions under state habeas corpus laws, courts may deny relief for
reasons including that the writ only provides for an inmate's total release or that the writ
requires an inmate to exhaust all other remedies. See KERPER & KERPER, supra, at 322 (explaining that prisoners seeking relief for prison conditions under state habeas corpus laws will
likely find: (1) writ will be denied because of total release doctrine; (2) writ will be denied
because of hands-off doctrine; (3) writ will be denied because of exhaustion of remedies requirement; (4) writ will be considered if prisoner alleges facts showing conditions amount to
cruel and unusual punishment; or, (5) writ will be allowed to challenge any administrative
decision that is uncontrolled and arbitrary).
Other problems arise when prisoners seek damages under state tort or constitutional law
for injuries caused by harsh prison conditions. Recovery may be barred in these suits due to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the doctrine ofjudicial immunity, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or various other state-imposed obstacles. See KERPER & KERPER, supra, at 32145 (discussing application of doctrines barring recovery of damages); see also Friesen, supra, at
1276 (finding that recovering damages under state constitutional law may be frustrated by
obstacles such as sovereign immunity for defendant governmental entity, shields against official liability found in state statutory or common law doctrines, possible common law defenses
for public employees based on "good faith" and "reasonableness," the availability of alternative remedies, general unavailability of attorneys' fees, notice provisions in state tort claims
acts, strict damages limitations, and denial of punitive damages and jury trials).
16. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing problems of prison overcrowding and rates of incarceration).
17. The difficulty arises from the fact that the Court in Wilson added a previously unarticulated burden on prisoners to prove the culpability of prison officials in Eighth Amendment
challenges to confinement conditions, i.e., the state-of-mind requirement. See infra notes 95109 and accompanying text (discussing Court's derivation of state-of-mind requirement and
deliberate indifference standard). In addition to limiting prisoners' Eighth Amendment protection to cases when prison officials are mentally culpable, the Supreme Court has also lim-
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needs of prisoners in jeopardy and adds another source of aggravation to the problems facing the nation's prisons. Moreover, the conflicting policies of*incarcerating more individuals and restricting
prisoners' Eighth Amendment protection could result in an increase
of prison riots and other violent means of reform instigated by
inmates. 18
The Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter, however, does not necessarily spell such doom. There is sufficient flexibility in the terms
"deliberate indifference" and "identifiable human need" for lower
courts to avoid compounding problems created by the conflicting
policies.1 9 This Note focuses on these two terms and on other ambiguities in the decision, and recommends that courts interpret Wilson
in a light most favorable to prisoners. If this is done, the safety of
prisoners and their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment will be preserved during the present prison dilemma and for
times to come.
Part I of this Note traces the origin of the Eighth Amendment's
state-of-mind requirement. Part I also identifies the development of
the Eighth Amendment's objective standard in confinement condition cases. Part II presents the facts of Wilson v. Seiter, and discusses
the holding and reasoning of the Supreme Court. Part III analyzes
the impact of Wilson by providing possible interpretations for the
ambiguities in the decision. The Note concludes in Part IV with a
recommendation that courts apply interpretations that construe amited the protection afforded to prisoners under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Prior to 1986, a prisoner deprived of property through the negligence of state officials could make out a successful claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981) (finding that Due
Process Clause may be implicated by negligent conduct of prison officials). This point of law,
however, was overturned in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) and its companion case
of Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). In Daniels, a prisoner daimed that he had been
deprived of liberty without due process of law when he was injured by slipping on a pillow
negligently left on the stairs by a correctional facility deputy. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. Striking its finding in Parratt,the Court rejected the prisoner's claim and held that a lack of due
care was not enough to implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. l
at 330-31. The Court found that there must be more than a negligent act causing unintended
loss or injury to life, liberty, or property to implicate the Due Process Clause. lId at 328.
Therefore, by adding a similar state-of-mind requirement for Due Process claims, the
Supreme Court effectively foreclosed the availability of the Due Process Clause as a viable
alternative to the Eighth Amendment in prison conditions cases. See Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (asserting that in context of officers injuring prisoners with forceful
security measures during prison riot, Due Process Clause affords no greater protection than
Eighth Amendment).
18. See William C. Collins, The Defense Perspective on Prison-ConditionsCases, in 1 PRISONERS
AND THE LAW 7-3, at 7-7 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1990) ("[O]ne potential effect of reduced court
intervention may be to return to those unfortunate days when prison reform occurred only as
the intermittent result of prison riots and other institutional scandals.").
19. See infra Parts III(A)(1) and III(C) (discussing possible interpretations of terms).
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biguities in favor of prisoners, so as to mitigate the adverse impact
of Wilson v. Seiter.
I. BACKGROUND

Challenging prison conditions in federal courts is a relatively recent development, having its beginnings in the mid-1960s. 20 Prior
to the 1960s, federal courts took a "hands-off" approach when dealing with prison issues. 2 ' With the departure from this approach
came dramatic growth in the number of cases brought by prisoners
alleging constitutional violations. 22 Courts abandoned their reluctance to become involved and took an active role in reforming
23
prisons.
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney24 joined the lower
courts in condemning unconstitutional prison conditions by uphold20.

Prisoners gained substantial access to the federal courts in the 1960s through the

decisions of the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Monroe, the Court expanded the availability of section
1983 claims to claims against officials acting under color of state law who violate the constitutional rights of individuals. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-84. In Robinson, the Court extended the

applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the states. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67; see also
David J. Gottlieb, The Legacy of Wolfish and Chapman: Some Thoughts About "Big Prison Case"
Litigation in the 1980s, in 1 PRISONERS AND THE LAw 2-3, at 2-5 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1990)
(discussing Supreme Court's revival of Civil Rights Act, beginning in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) and use of Act to encompass abuse of state-delegated authority within federal
court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); James Rosenzweig, State Prison Conditions and the
Eighth Amendment. What StandardforReform Under Section 1983?, 1987 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 411, 428
(1987) ("Prison reform suits are a modern phenomenon .... ").
21. See, e.g., United States ex reL Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964)
(noting that state penitentiary issues are sole concern of state and would only be addressed by
federal courts under exceptional circumstances), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Kirby v.
Thomas, 336 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that federal courts do not have authority
to regulate ordinary internal management and discipline of prisons); Stroud v. Swope, 187
F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.) (stating that it is well settled that courts' function is not to superintend treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951);
see also Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-4 (noting that reasons for "hands-off" doctrine include
theory that prisoners are slaves of state, demands of federalism, separation of powers, lack of
judicial expertise in prison affairs, potential for flood of litigation, and need to conserve state
financial reserves).
22. See Robert G. Doumar, Prisoners'Civil Rights Suits: A Pompous Delusion, 11 GEO. MASON
U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) (remarking that in 1966, 218 cases were filed by prisoners alleging
constitutional violations; in 1982, the number of cases filed by prisoners had increased to over
16,000).
23. Federal courts took an active role in reforming prisons by placing the prisons under
court order or consent decrees to improve the conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Williams v.
Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding district court's order for prison
officials to improve inmate safety and medical care); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1322
(5th Cir. 1974) (approving district court's order to reform prison); Johnson v. Levine, 588
F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (4th Cir. 1978) (affirming district court's order for prison officials to alleviate overcrowding and move mentally disturbed inmates from their confinement area until it
could be improved); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 359 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that courts "have emerged as a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate

inhumane conditions").
24. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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ing a district court's order to reform a prison. 25 In so doing, the
Court confirmed that confinement itself is a form of punishment
subject to the provisions of the Eighth Amendment. 26 The Court,
however, failed to articulate a standard for determining when confinement conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. It was unnecessary to do so in Hutto because the prison officials did not challenge
the district court's finding that the conditions constituted cruel and
27
unusual punishment.
It was not until 1981, in Rhodes v. Chapman,28 that the Supreme
Court considered the disputed contention that conditions at a
prison, particularly double celling, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 29 Although the Court did not find a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, 30 it did conclude that prison conditions, alone
or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities, and thus violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.3 ' Though affirming
the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to confinement conditions challenges, the Court's broad language provided little gui25. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (upholding district court's 30-day limit on
sentences of punitive isolation). In Hutto, the district court described the prison in question as
a "dark and evil world completely alien to the free world." Id at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). The administrators of the institution housed the
prisoners together in 100-man barracks. IA at 681 n.3. At night, some convicts, known as
"creepers," would slip from their beds and crawl along the floor to stalk their victims. IA In
one 18-month period, there were 16 stabbings in the barracks. Id Homosexual rape was so
common that some inmates would spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guard
stations. IA As for punitive isolation, an average of four inmates at a time were housed for an
indeterminate length of time in an eight-by-ten-foot cell with no windows. IA at 682. There
was no furniture in the cell other than a source of water and a toilet which could only be
flushed from outside the cell. Id
26. Id. at 685.
27. See id (recognizing that prison officials did not disagree with district court's conclusion that conditions at prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
28. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
29. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339-40 (1981) (setting forth prisoners' claim that
housing two inmates in cells intended for one person, known as "double celling," constituted
cruel and unusual punishment). The prisoners' claim was that each cell was only 63 square
feet in area, and that double ceiling exacerbated problems of overcrowding and close confinement. Id at 341, 343. The correctional facility disputed the Eighth Amendment claims by
stating that double celing had not deprived inmates of basic necessities; violence in the facility had not increased due to double celling, and availability of resources to inmates had not
significantly decreased as a result of the practice. IL at 342.
30. See id at 352 (concluding that conditions at prison were not cruel and unusual). The
Court noted that the practice of double ceiling was not per se a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. See id at 348-49 (rejecting district court's finding of constitutional violation and
maintaining that at most double ceiling inflicted pain, but Constitution does not mandate that
prisoners be free of discomfort).
31. See id. at 347 (stating that conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment when
they result in "unquestioned and serious deprivations of human needs"). Prison conditions
that are merely restrictive or harsh do not violate the Eighth Amendment, but are considered
part of the punishment inflicted on those who are incarcerated as a result of their criminal
actions. Id
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dance for the lower courts. The standard applied by the lower
32
courts in prison condition cases, therefore, continued to vary.
Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has restricted the
constitutional protection afforded to prisoners.3 3 This has
prompted commentators to ponder whether the "hands-off" doctrine has returned.3 4 The Court has implemented this restriction
utilizing two basic means. First, prison officials must be shown to
possess a culpable state of mind with regard to the deprivations
32. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing confusion in lower courts after
Rhodes and listing cases).
Throughout this Note, Rhodes v. Chapman is cited for three basic propositions. First, the
decision, by neither affirming nor rejecting the totality of circumstances test, provided little
guidance for lower courts in evaluating the objective severity of prison conditions. See infa
notes 64-79 and accompanying text (examining different court applications of either core conditions or totality of circumstances test in determining Eighth Amendment violations in
prison facilities). Second, the decision did not definitively adopt a state-of-mind requirement
in Eighth Amendment prison condition cases. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text
(commenting on Court's focus on seriousness of prison conditions as opposed to intent of
prison officials). Third, the decision apparently considered prison conditions to be part of the
penalty a criminal must pay. See infa note 57 and accompanying text (noting Court's recognition that, within limits, harsh conditions of prison facilities are part of punitive nature of
incarceration).
33. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 325-26 (1986) (rejecting prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim for injuries received from correctional officer during prison riot
because inmate failed to prove officers acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm") (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (rejecting inmate's claim on
grounds that Due Process Clause is not implicated by mere negligence); Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (denying relief to inmate for injuries received on grounds that Due
Process Clause is not implicated by mere negligence); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104,
106-07 (1976) (applying deliberate indifference standard to prisoner's claim of deprived medical needs and rejecting relief for prisoner). But see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1002
(1992) (reversing court of appeals decision that denied relief to prisoner because he suffered
no "significant injury") (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990)).
One recurring theme in Supreme Court cases restricting constitutional protection for the
incarcerated is that courts should defer to the judgment of state legislatures and prison officials. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 322 (noting that neither judge nor jury should
freely substitute its judgment for considered choice of prison officials); Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. at 352 (commenting that courts delegate duty of dealing with prison discomfort to
legislatures and prison administration); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (warning
that many federal courts, in name of Constitution, have become "enmeshed in minutiae of
prison operations"); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (noting that resolving prison problems "require[s] expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government" and that "courts are ill-equipped to deal with the.., problems of
prison administration and reform"), overruled on othergrounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 407-14 (1989).
34. See Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the FederalCourts: The Futureof FederalJudicial
Intervention in PrisonAdministration, 71 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 219 (1980) (positing
that Supreme Court decision in Bell v. Wolfish may signal return of hands-off doctrine); James
E. Robertson, When the Supreme Court Commands, Do the Lower Federal Courts Obey? The Impact of
Rhodes v. Chapman on CorrectionalLitigation, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 79, 100 (1984) (characterizing
Supreme Court's opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman as expressing new hands-off doctrine). But see
Frank A. Kaufman, Reflections of a FederalJudge, in 1 PRISONERS AND THE LAw 1-3, at 1-8 (Ira P.
Robbins ed., 1985) (considering developments in prison law and predicting "full hands-off
approach of the past is unlikely to occur").
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and/or injuries of prisoners, 5 and second, the challenged deprivations and/or injuries must meet a standard of sufficient seriousness
to reach an unconstitutional level.3 6 The history of these two limitations in Eighth Amendment cases is considered below.
A.

The Mental Element in the Eighth Amendment

Prior to Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court applied a state-ofmind requirement for Eighth Amendment cases outside the context
of challenges to confinement conditions. In Estelle v. Gamble,3 7 the
Supreme Court addressed the Eighth Amendment implications of
depriving a prisoner of adequate medical care.3 8 After considering
the prison officials' obligation to meet the medical needs of prisoners, 3 9 the Court concluded that it was "deliberate indifference" to
the serious medical needs of prisoners, not negligence, that rose to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment. 40 The Court reasoned
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited punishments that were incompatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society," 41 or that involved "the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain."'4 2 In the context of medical care, the
Court found that only deliberate indifference43 to the prisoner's
needs could offend such standards of decency.
In a subsequent dictum, the Supreme Court interpreted the Estelle
35. See infra notes 37-61 and accompanying text (examining development of state-ofmind requirement in Eighth Amendment cases); see also supra note 17 (discussing recent
Supreme Court cases requiring more than mere negligence to implicate Due Process Clause
of Fourteenth Amendment).
36. See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text (comparing cases that address unconstitutional levels of prison deprivations and injuries).
37. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
38. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 100-01 (1976). The respondent, Gamble, alleged
that the petitioners had subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by improperly treating his injured back. Id.
39. See id at 103 (finding that denial of medical care inflicts unnecessary suffering that is
"inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency"). To determine what constituted
"contemporary standards of decency," the Court surveyed modem legislation proscribing the
unnecessary suffering of prisoners. See id at 103 n.8 (providing list of state statutes as well as
model legislation and proposed minimum standards regarding health care of prisoners).
40. Id at 104.
41. Id at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
42. Id at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion)
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). By finding that the Eighth Amendment is violated by the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or by punishment that is incompatible with evolving
standards of decency, the Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment may be violated by
reaching either threshold independently. Id. The second threshold, a finding of incompatibility with evolving standards of decency, does not have a state-of-mind requirement. Id.
Thus it appears that Estelle v. Gamble cannot be cited for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment has an absolute state-of-mind requirement for cruel and unusual punishment
determinations.
43. Id at 106.
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v. Gamble decision to mean that after incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain would implicate the Eighth
Amendment. 44 This dictum proved to carry considerable weight because, in 1986, the Court relied on it in Whitley v. Albers45 to conclude broadly that any conduct not purporting to be punishment
must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's
treatment to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 4 6 Furthermore, the Court found that not only is there a general requirement
for an Eighth Amendment claimant to allege and prove unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain, but also that the requirement should
be applied with due regard for differences in the challenged conduct. 4 7 The meaning of "unnecessary and wanton," according to
44. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) ("After incarceration, only the
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." (citations omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976))). Ingraham considered whether corporal punishment administered at a public
school constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 653. In Ingraham, the Court extended the holding of Estelle in two ways. First, it set forth the proposition that post-incarceration Eighth Amendment challenges required a showing of prison official wantonness, thus
apparently abandoning Estelle's other independent threshold that punishment incompatible
with evolving standards of decency would violate the Eighth Amendment. Second, the interpretation extended Estelle to Eighth Amendment challenges beyond those of inadequate medical care. To conclude that only wanton conduct violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court in
Ingraham,and later in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), made a negative inference from
prior case law. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Whitley v. Albers). The
Supreme Court had not previously stated in any of its opinions that all conduct must be wanton to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. It had merely asserted that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the wanton infliction of pain. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 10203 (1976) (finding punishment that involves unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to Eighth Amendment); Louisiana ex rel, Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)
(asserting that prohibition of wanton infliction of pain developed in American law from Bill of
Rights of 1688).
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court purported to find support for an Eighth Amendment
state-of-mind requirement in Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). In
Resweber, the petitioner alleged that it was cruel and unusual punishment for government officials to subject him to a second electrocution after a malfunctioning electric chair disrupted
the first electrocution attempt. IM at 460, 464. The Court held that there was no violation of
the Eighth Amendment because the initial failure was "an unforeseeable accident" and there
was no "purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain" involved in the proposed execution. Id at 464. Using this case to support an Eighth Amendment state-of-mind
requirement, however, is problematic. Although "purpose to inflict unnecessary pain" suggests an intent requirement, the second part of the quotation, "nor any unnecessary pain,"
suggests that unnecessary pain without regard to the state of mind of the inflictor would be
sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-7376) [hereinafter Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae] (arguing that second portion of quotation suggests
truly "unnecessary" pain would be unconstitutional even if accidental). Furthermore, because the challenged action was an "unforeseeable accident," it is unclear whether simple
negligence would have invoked the protection of the Eighth Amendment in this instance.
45. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
46. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (following Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 670 (1977)).
47. Id. at 320. For example, the Court commented that the deliberate indifference standard of Estelle v. Gamble would not adequately take into account the competing obligations of
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48
the Court, depended on the type of conduct challenged.
The challenged conduct in Whitley was a correctional officer's
shooting of an inmate in the leg during an attempt to quell a prison

riot.4 9 The Court reasoned that in light of the disciplinary con-

straints on officials in circumstances such as these, a higher threshold than the deliberate indifference standard should apply. 50 The
Court concluded, therefore, that in cases of prison officials injuring
inmates while attempting to suppress prison disturbances, "unnecessary and wanton" infliction of pain means force applied "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."' 5'
The conduct of officers would violate the Eighth Amendment in the
52
prison riot setting only by meeting this high standard.
Yet, a pressing issue remained: If inmate challenges to the postincarceration conduct of prison officials required a showing of wantonness under the Eighth Amendment, should substandard confinement conditions be considered a product of prison official "conduct
not purporting to be punishment," or part of the sentenced punishment levied by judge or statute? The distinction is essential. If confinement conditions are part of the sentence, then there is no need
to inquire into the state of mind of the inflictor because a sentence is
intentionally imposed and, by definition, inflicts punishment. 53 If,
however, the conditions are established by conduct not purporting
officials attempting to control prison disturbances. Id.;
see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (explaining findings of Estelle).
48. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (finding that meaning of wantonness should be determined considering competing obligations of prison officials). The Court in Whitley effectively
placed the meaning of "unnecessary and wanton" on a shifting scale between negligence and
malicious intent. The more the interests and obligations of acting prison officials outweigh
the harm to the prisoners, the closer the meaning of "unnecessary and wanton" moves toward
malicious intent.
49. Id at 314.
50. See id. at 320 (expressing Court's recognition that deliberate indifference standard
applied previously in Eighth Amendment cases was inadequate when dealing with prison officials' reactions to prison riots). The Court argued that prison disturbances require officials to
consider competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff and visitors, as well as
for the inmates themselves. Id.In the prison riot setting, officials must meet safety concerns
"in haste, under pressure, and ...without the luxury of a second chance." Id Considering
this, the Court found that a higher standard than deliberate indifference was justified for
Eighth Amendment challenges to excessive force administered during prison riots.
51. Id.at 320-21 (quotingJohnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
52. Since handing down its decision in Wilson, the Supreme Court has extended the
Whitley standard to apply in all Eighth Amendment challenges alleging that prison officials'
used excessive force, not merely excessive force in the prison riot setting. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992) (stating that extension of Whitley standard to all excessive force allegations "works no innovation").
53. A "sentence" is defined as "[t]he judgment formally pronounced by the court or
judge upon the defendant after his [or her] conviction in a criminal prosecution, imposing the
punishment to be inflicted, usually in the form of a fine, incarceration, or probation." BLACK'S
LAW DIa ONARY 1362 (6th ed. 1990).
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to be punishment, then inmates must show some degree of intent
on the part of the responsible officials before the conduct can be
considered punishment and therefore brought within the purview of
the Eighth Amendment.M
The Court in Whitley suggested that post-incarceration conduct
rather than sentenced punishment creates poor confinement conditions, and that Eighth Amendment challenges to those conditions
require a showing of wantonness akin to that of Eighth Amendment
challenges brought on grounds of inadequate medical care and excessive use of force by prison officials during prison riots.55 Yet
four years earlier, with the same Supreme Court precedent available, the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman 56 failed to go so far. In Rhodes,
confinement conditions were deemed to be part of the penalty that
criminal offenders must pay and were not considered merely the
57
product of prison officials' post-incarceration conduct.
In addressing the inmates' Eighth Amendment challenge to confinement conditions at the prison, the Court in Rhodes focused on
prison condition severity rather than on the culpability or state of
54. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether poor confinement conditions at a pre-trial detention facility violated the Constitution. Id at 527. The Court considered the petitioners' allegations under the Due Process
Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment applies only after
criminal prosecution. See id at 535 n.16 ("'Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only
after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with
criminal prosecutions."' (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977))). The
Court found that the Due Process Clause is violated if the pre-trial detainees are punished
prior to conviction. Id at 535. To determine if conditions at a particular facility constitute
punishment, the Court held that judges must decide if conditions are imposed for the purpose
of punishment or are merely incident to some other legitimate governmental purpose, Id. at
538. The Court declined to restrict "legitimate governmental purpose" to include only the
ensuring of detainees' presence at trial via pre-trial detention. Id. at 540. Instead, the Court
noted that effective management of a detention facility would dispel any inference of intent to
punish. Id The Court thus considered confinement conditions to be the product of the detention officials' conduct. The conditions could not become "punishment" without actual or
inferred punitive intent. Wolfish, however, cannot stand for the sweeping proposition that all
challenges to confinement conditions under the Eighth Amendment require a showing of a
prison official's punitive intent. Unlike pre-trial detention situations, Eighth Amendment
cases contain underlying sentences of incarceration that arguably include conditions of confinement as part of punishment. The Court in Wofish only addressed unconstitutional punishment at the pre-trial stage, and therefore left open the issue of whether post-trial prison
conditions are part of the formal sentence or are the product of prison officials' post-incarceration conduct not purporting to be punishment.
55. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority, "It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing
conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
56. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
57. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,347 (1981) ("To the extent that such [confinement] conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.").
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mind of prison officials. 58 Although the Court did note that prison
conditions must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain,59 it did not clearly make such a finding an Eighth Amendment requirement. 60 Instead, the Court decided to address Eighth
Amendment claims by considering objective factors to the maximum extent. 61 Therefore, with the findings of the Court in Rhodes
and Whitley appearing to be at odds, the issue of whether a state-ofmind inquiry was required for Eighth Amendment challenges to
confinement conditions remained to be resolved.
B. Deprivations and Injuries Prohibitedby the Eighth Amendment

Because traditional Eighth Amendment standards were predicated on evaluating specific sanctions rather than condition-related
deprivations and injuries, courts had to develop a standard by which
to evaluate the constitutionality of prison conditions. 62 As prison
case law developed, a number of tests emerged to assist courts in
63
making such an assessment.
58. The Court was concerned with whether the degree of pain or discomfort caused by

double celling in and of itself constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id at 348-49. The
Court concluded that the practice did not reach that level of cruel and unusual punishment.
d; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (noting that Court in Rhodes considered only seriousness of deprivation and not state of mind of prison officials).
59. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
60. Curiously, the Court stated that the conditions at the prison fell short of being cruel
and unusual because they did not inflict "unnecessary or wanton pain." Id at 348 (emphasis
added). In so doing, the Court suggested that unnecessary pain, regardless of the state of
mind of the prison officials, would violate the Eighth Amendment. Some commentators, however, have argued that Rhodes did articulate a state-of-mind requirement for Eighth Amendment challenges to confinement conditions. See Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-16 (noting that
by mentioning grossly-disproportionate-to-offense and wanton-infliction-of-pain standard,
Court in Rhodes made mistake of trying to fit square peg of intent-based standards into round
hole of inadequate prison conditions); Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 418 (finding Court in
Rhodes apparently extended state-of-mind requirement to prison condition cases because majority used "wanton" to modify "infliction of pain" and approved of "contemporary standard
of decency" language proposed in Estelle v. Gamble). But see Wilson v. Seiter, I11 S.Ct. 2321,
2329-30 (1991) (WhiteJ, concurring) (stating that Rhodes makes it "crystal clear" that Eighth
Amendment challenges to confinement conditions only examine objective severity, not subjective intent of government officials).
61. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75
(1980) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
62. See Ira P. Robbins & Michael B. Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An
Analysis of Pugh v. Lock and FederalCourt Supervision of State PenalAdministration Under the Eighth

Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893, 900-06 (1977) (positing that doctrinal understandings of
cruel and unusual punishment as punishment that "shocks the conscience," punishment that
is disproportionate to offense committed, and punishment that is in excess of legitimate penal
aim are problematic when applied in Eighth Amendment challenges to prison conditions).
Additionally, broad Supreme Court language such as "[the Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), failed to clearly direct courts in their evaluations of the constitutionality of prison conditions.
63. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text (discussing different tests applied by
courts).
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Over the years, courts most often applied the "totality of circumstances" test.64 This test required courts to assess the aggregate impact of all the prison conditions in determining whether the
conditions threatened the mental or physical well-being of the inmates. 6 5 The test did not require that courts base their findings of
cruel and unusual punishment on one particularly egregious condition or deprivation; rather, the test required courts to consider con66
ditions as a whole.
The Ninth Circuit applied the "core conditions" test.6 7 This test
operated as a totality of circumstances test with a narrower focus.
The premise of the test was that a select group of conditions-adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal
safety-represented the core concerns of Eighth Amendment protection. 6 8 The Eighth Amendment was violated under this test
64. See, e.g., French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that lack
of space and furnishings, unwholesome food, medical neglect, and threats to prisoner safety
combined to constitute cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Clay
v. Miller, 626 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding courts must look to totality of circumstances to determine extent of mental and physical effects of prison conditions on inmates);
Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 400 (10th Cir. 1977) (upholding district court's finding that
overcrowding, when considered in tandem with other circumstances at prison, constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1974)
(finding Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not limited
to specific acts of individuals, but also applies to general conditions of confinement); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (noting that aspects of prison life must be
considered together and that all conditions in combination have cumulative impact), aft'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The totality of circumstances test is also referred to as the "totality
of conditions" test. See Peterkin v.Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1022 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying "totality of conditions" test); Maydun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981) (referring to
Seventh Circuit's test as "totality of conditions of confinement").
65. See Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-18 (discussing mechanics of totality of conditions
test); Robbins & Buser, supra note 62, at 906-14 (discussing development and definition of
totality of conditions test).
66. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H. 1977) ("Even though no
single condition of incarceration rises to the level of a constitutional violation, exposure to the
cumulative effect of prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual
punishment.").
67. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting totality of
conditions test and finding that specific, basic need must be deprived to violate Eighth
Amendment); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that courts
must focus on specific conditions of confinement rather than on totality of all conditions); see
also Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-18 (reviewing Ninth Circuit opinions and referring to its
analysis as adopting "core conditions" test).
68. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258; Wright, 642 F.2d at 1132-33. In Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1978), overrledon other grounds sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1978), the
Second Circuit stated that "[a]n institution's obligation under the Eighth Amendment is at an
end if it furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal sanitation." Wofish, 573 F.2d at 125. The Ninth Circuit adopted this
language as defining the scope of Eighth Amendment protection. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682
F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Second Circuit's Wolfish v. Levi standard as defining
basic necessities protected by Eighth Amendment); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 113233 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Wolfsh standard as establishing type of treatment condemned by
Eighth Amendment).
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when a prisoner was deprived of at least one of the core conditions. 69 It was not enough, for instance, for a prisoner merely to
prove prison overcrowding. The overcrowding had to be shown to
deprive an inmate of a core-area need. 70 In making its assessment,
however, a court could consider whether the cumulative effect of
71
other conditions together deprived an inmate of a core need.
Finally, other courts applied a variation of the core conditions
test. 72 These courts simply expanded or restricted the list of core
conditions. 73 Nonetheless, as with the Ninth Circuit, these courts
required that at least one of the conditions be deprived in order to
violate the Eighth Amendment. 74 As with the Ninth Circuit test,
these courts provided that the effect of other conditions working together could be considered by the courts in making their Eighth
75
Amendment determinations.
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court failed to articulate
clearly which test, if any, was appropriate for evaluating challenged
prison conditions. 76 Instead, the Court broadly noted that certain
conditions "alone, or in combination, may deprive inmates of the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." 77 Applying this
standard to the facts, the Court held that "double-celling" did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, considering that it neither deprived
69. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47 (rejecting totality of conditions test and finding
that specific, basic need must be deprived to violate Eighth Amendment); Wright, 642 F.2d at
1133 (finding that courts must focus on specific conditions of confinement rather than on
totality of all conditions).
70. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1249 (finding that district court had not specified particular
effects of prison overcrowding and remanding for precise determination of effects on prisoner
and whether those effects constituted violation of Eight Amendment); see also Gottlieb, supra
note 20, at 2-18 (discussing application of core conditions test in Hoptowit).
71. Hoplowit, 682 F.2d at 1247.
72. See infra note 73 (providing cases applying test).
73. Compare Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (restricting Eighth Amendment protection to specific necessities of food, shelter, health care, or personal safety) with Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 864-65 (6th Cir. 1990) (listing specific
conditions on which to base Eighth Amendment claim as inadequate access to shower facilities, denial of medical treatment, overcrowding, threats to safety, vermin infestation, inadequate lighting, inadequate ventilation, unsanitary eating conditions, and housing inmates with
known dangerous individuals), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) and Walker v.
Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1985) (referring broadly to scope of Eighth Amendment
as protecting "life's necessities") (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
74. See Wilson, 893 F.2d at 864 (requiring that Eighth Amendment violation be based on
specific condition); Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 839 (noting that Eighth Amendment is
satisfied if each of basic inmate needs is met).
75. See Inmates of Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 839 (discussing shortcomings of district court
opinion and observing that it failed to channel its totality of conditions assessment toward
specific deprived need); Walker, 771 F.2d at 925 ("In certain extreme circumstances the totality itself may amount to an eighth amendment violation, but there still must exist a specific
condition on which to base the eighth amendment claim.").
76. See Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-17 (observing that Court in Rhodes neither lauded nor
condemned totality of circumstances test).
77. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
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prisoners of essential food, medical care, sanitation, or safety requirements nor created other intolerable conditions. 78 Subsequent
to the Rhodes decision, the lower courts differed in their interpretations of the ruling. Some found the opinion to be an affirmance of
the totality of circumstances test, while others found it to provide
support for the core conditions test or its variations. 79 The proper
objective standard, therefore, remained to be clarified.
II.
A.

WILSON V. SEITER

The Facts of the Case

Pearly Wilson, an inmate at Hocking Correctional Facility (HCF)
in Nelsonville, Ohio, complained of prison overcrowding, excessive
noise, insufficient locker and storage space, inadequate heating and
cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms,
unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with
mentally and physically ill inmates.8 0 He brought an action under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187181 against Richard P.
Seiter, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation, and Carl
Humphreys, then warden of HCF. Wilson alleged that these con78. I at 348; see supra note 29 (describing facts of case).
79. Compare Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding Rhodes made
clear that Eighth Amendment prison condition cases are to be evaluated by totality of circumstances at prison), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991) and Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868,
874 (7th Cir. 1981) ("We are aware that the essence of an Eighth Amendment violation consists of the totality of the conditions of confinement.") (citing Rhodes v. Chapman)with Inmates
of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that Rhodes limited totality
of circumstances test to implicate Eighth Amendment only when conditions deprived inmates
of life's necessities) and Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that
relatively brief statement in Rhodes did not create totality of circumstances standard; rather, it
suggested requirement of specific conditions depriving inmates of at least one enumerated
necessity). Interestingly, Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion in Rhodes that
"[t]he Court today adopts the totality-of-the-circumstances test." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. at 363 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991).
81. The relevant portion of section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding or redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Under section 1983, a prisoner may seek redress when a person
acting under color of state law deprives him or her of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
federal laws. Id Section 1983 imposes liability only on "persons" who deprive individuals of
constitutional or federal rights. Id. In Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, the Supreme Court
held that a state is not a person under section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Court concluded that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is "no different from a suit against the State itself." Id. at 71.
A suit will be considered to be brought against an official in his or her official capacity if it
seeks to impose liability on the governniental entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165-68 (1985) (distinguishing between personal and official capacity suits). Section 1983 ac-
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finement conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment in vi82
olation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
At trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
along with supporting affidavits. 83 Wilson's affidavits described the
conditions in controversy and noted that the respondents had failed
to remedy the conditions after notification. 84 The respondents' affidavits denied the existence of overcrowded conditions, inadequate
heating, inadequate safety, and inadequate protection of prisoners
from communicable diseases. 8 5 Furthermore, the respondents alleged that they had attempted to remedy certain conditions by enacting noise control regulations, installing two ventilation fans,
employing an exterminator, and improving sanitation. 86 The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents, noting
that the prisoners failed to demonstrate obduracy and wantonness
87
on the part of the prison officials.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
tions may be brought against persons in their official capacities, however, only when injunctive relief is sought. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10.
Municipalities may also be considered persons under section 1983 and, therefore, can be
held liable for depriving persons of constitutional or federal rights. Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Municipalities or local governments are not immune
from section 1983 suits when the policy or custom that is the subject of a lawsuit was adopted
by the officials of the governing entity. Id at 690-91. A local government may not be held
liable for the torts of its employees under section 1983, unless the employees acted pursuant
to the entity's policy or custom. Id. at 694.
Government officials performing discretionary functions are "shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate dearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Prison personnel receive this qualified immunity. See Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (refusing absolute immunity for state prison officials but
granting qualified immunity).
For an overview of the mechanics of section 1983 suits, see Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-1990, 79 GEo. LJ. 1253,
1281-94 (1991) and Sheldon Nahmod, Government Liability Under Section 1983: The Present Is

Prologue, 21 URB. LAw. 1 (1989).
82. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2322-23. For an explanation of the manner in which prison
conditions can violate the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 17 (discussing development
of Fourteenth Amendment in prisoner suits).
83. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323.
84. Id.; see Brief of Petitioner at 4-6 n.3, Wilson v. Seiter, IlI S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 897376) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner] (summarizing allegations of petitioner regarding ventilation, sanitation, overcrowding, lack of heat, and safety and protection from communicable
disease). Inmate Wilson alleged that he sent a three-page letter complaining of the confinement conditions to respondents Seiter and Humphreys. Id. at 5-6. According to Wilson,
Seiter never responded to the letter, and Humphreys responded but failed to take any corrective action other than to forward the letter to the HCF Unit Manager and his staff. Id.
85. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 84, at 4-6 n.3.
86. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 84, at 6 (providing specific details of prison officials'
alleged attempts to remedy conditions); see Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (stating
that prison officials denied existence of some alleged conditions and described efforts to remedy others).
87. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 863 (6th Cir. 1990) (reviewing trial court's basis for
accepting respondents' motion for summary judgment), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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the lower court's decision, albeit using different reasoning. The
Sixth Circuit held that the challenged conditions were not serious
enough to establish an Eighth Amendment violation,88 and that the
petitioner failed to establish that the respondents acted with "persistent malicious cruelty," as required by Whitley v. Albers.89 The
court of appeals therefore rejected the inmate's claim by applying
the stringent state-of-mind requirement of Whitley, a requirement
that had previously been applied by the Supreme Court only in the
context of prisoner challenges alleging use of excessive force by officers in quelling prison disturbances. 90
B.

The Holding and Reasoning in Wilson v. Seiter

1. The state-of-mind requirement
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter,
concluded that poor prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment only when the responsible officials imposing the conditions have a culpable state of
mind. 91 Furthermore, the Court concluded that "deliberate indifference" is the level of culpability required to be shown on the part
of prison officials to violate the Eighth Amendment in prison condition cases. 92
a.

The derivation of the requirement

The Court supported its state-of-mind requirement for prison
condition cases with two basic arguments. First, the majority noted
88. Id at 865. The Sixth Circuit found that even if the allegations of inadequate cooling,
housing with mentally ill inmates, and overcrowding were true, they failed to establish violative conditions. L This conclusion was based in large part on the court's finding that exposure to excessive heat was only "occasional," and overcrowding was not "constant." Id.
89. Ia at 867. The court of appeals referred to the Whitley standard as prohibiting only
actions of "obduracy and wantonness .. . marked by persistent malicious cruelty." Id The
Supreme Court in Wilson, however, analyzed the lower court's use of the standard by concluding that the above quotation and consistent reference to the "Whitley standard" meant that the
court of appeals believed the criterion for liability to be whether the respondents acted "malidously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2328 (1991) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). See supra notes
45-51 and accompanying text (describing holding and facts of Whitley).
90. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Whitley).
91. The Court considered this the "subjective component" of an Eighth Amendment
prison claim and referred to it as an inquiry into whether the officials acted with a "sufficiently
culpable state of mind." See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, as
requiring that it is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith that
violates Eighth Amendment with respect to conduct that establishes confinement conditions).
92. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text (discussing Court's derivation of"deliberate indifference" standard).
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that prior case law mandates the requirement.9 3 Second, the majority noted that an intent requirement is inherent in the meaning of
94
the word "punishment."
The majority's use of prior case law turned largely on the assumption that confinement conditions are to be treated as part of prison
officials' conduct not purporting to be punishment, rather than as
part of a prisoner's specific sentence.9 5 As discussed earlier, 9 6 the
importance of this distinction is dear. The Eighth Amendment is
implicated only by cruel and unusual punishment. If confinement
conditions are attributed to post-incarceration conduct not purporting to be punishment, then some further inquiry is necessary to
bring that conduct within the purview of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court noted that the inquiry is whether the conduct constitutes
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."'9 7 Prison official
conduct violates the Eighth Amendment only when it meets this
threshold test.
If, however, the confinement conditions are considered part of
the penalty imposed by a judge or a statute, there is no need to
inquire whether the conditions are intended to be punishment. A
sentence is intentionally inflicted on a convict as punishment, and
the only question remaining is whether the resultant conditions are
cruel or unusual. 98 Thus, by categorizing confinement conditions as
93. See Wilson, 11 S. Ct. at 2323-24 (referring to Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 357 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1974)); see
also supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions in relation
to Eighth Amendment state-of-mind requirement).
94. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussing Court's analysis of meaning
of "punishment").
95. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326 (finding that because prison conditions do not constitute punishment unless deliberately imposed, courts only need to determine what state-ofmind requirement applies); see also id. at 2325 (arguing intent requirement should be applied
to Eighth Amendment challenges to short- and long-term conditions and stating that if pain
inflicted is not "formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge,"
some mental element must be attributed to inflicting officer before it can qualify as punishment); infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing Court's use of cases regarding
conduct not purporting to be punishment).
96. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing implications of attributing
confinement conditions to formal sentence or to post-incarceration conduct of prison
officials).
97. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324 (" 'After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ...constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.'" (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319)).
98. Justice White took this position in his concurring opinion. He found that the majority's reasoning disregarded previous decisions in which the Court made clear that conditions
were part of the punishment itself, even though the conditions were not specifically meted
out by a statute orjudge. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2328 (White, J., concurring). Referring to one
such previous decision, Justice White found that Rhodes made it "crystal clear" that Eighth
Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement were to be treated like Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment, and that this was to be done by examining the objective

1358

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1339

conduct not purporting to be punishment, the majority preserved
the need to inquire into the state of mind of prison officials. More
specifically, the majority preserved the need to inquire whether
prison officials impose harsh confinement conditions wantonly. 99
With confinement conditions classified as conduct and not as punishment, the Court supported the state-of-mind requirement for
prison condition challenges using Eighth Amendment cases that addressed other types of conduct not purporting to be punishment. 100
This did not prove to be a difficult task for the Court. The Court
noted that previous cases had stated that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the "wanton" infliction of pain,10 1 a rather uncontroversial
proposition, and that Whitley had held that conduct not purporting
to be punishment must be wanton to violate the Eighth Amendment.10 2 On the strength of these cases, the Court concluded that
an Eighth Amendment state-of-mind requirement exists for prison
condition challenges that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment
severity of the conditions rather than the subjective intent of the inflictor. Id at 2329-30, see
also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) ("Confinement in a prison or in an isolation
cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards.").
99. It is less clear, however, how the majority arrived at its classification of confinement
conditions. The majority apparently began its analysis of the Wilson case in the conduct rather
than punishment posture. At the beginning of the opinion, the Court commented that it had
first considered in Estelle v. Gamble whether the provisions of the Eighth Amendment could be
applied to deprivations not specifically part of the sentence but suffered during imprisonment. Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2323. The Court also quoted dicta from Whitley v. AlbTers that
attributed confinement conditions to conduct, but failed to develop and expressly rely on that
dicta. See id at 2324 (quoting passage from Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)
describing protection of Eighth Amendment with regard to conduct that occurs in connection
with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring control in
prison). In perhaps the most revealing statement on the matter, the Court argued in a footnote that specific acts or omissions cannot be distinguished from confinement conditions because the specific acts or omissions are conditions of that prisoner's confinement. Id at 2324
n.1. The Court continued by stating that there is no basis for distinguishing confinement
conditions from prison officials' conduct, much less for arguing that one is punishment and
the other is not. Id; see also id at 2326-27 (noting that prisoner's medical care is as much
condition of confinement as food prisoner is fed, clothes prisoner is issued, temperature prisoner is subjected to in cell, and protection prisoner is afforded against other inmates).
100. See idat 2323-24 (discussing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Louisiana ex re.Francis v. Resweber,329 U.S. 459 (1947), and finding
that these cases, along with others, mandate inquiry into state of mind of prison officials in
Eighth Amendment cases); see also supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text (discussing
above-cited cases).
101. See Wilson v. Seiter, III S.Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991) (finding that Estelle, 429 U.S. at
104, interpreted Eighth Amendment to prohibit "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain");
id at 2323 (finding that Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463, interpreted Eighth Amendment to prohibit
"wanton infliction of pain"); idat 2324 (finding that Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981), held "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" violates Eighth Amendment).
102. Ideat 2324 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986), that "[tlo be cruel
and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve
more than an ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interest or safety ....It is obduracy
and wantonness.., that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.").
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state-of-mind analysis used in improper medical treatment/exces03
sive force claims arising from prison riot situations.
The Court also supported its state-of-mind requirement by finding that there is an intent requirement implicit in the Eighth
Amendment. 10 4 05The Court based this finding on its definition of
"punishment."'
According to the Court, if punishment by definition requires "intent to inflict," then the cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment likewise requires
intentional infliction.' 0 6 With this argument, the Court made a very
broad and powerful statement: "If the pain inflicted is not formally
meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencingjudge, some
before it
mental element must be attributed to the inflicting0 officer
7
violation]."'1
Amendment
Eighth
an
can qualify [as
The Court's finding that there is a state-of-mind requirement for
Eighth Amendment challenges to prison conditions is troubling for
a number of reasons. First, by focusing on the intent of the inflictor
rather than on the suffering of the victim, the Court abandons the
important Eighth Amendment purpose of protecting the convicted
from excessive suffering.' 0 8 This goal would be better served by focusing on the effect of the punishment on the prisoner.' 0 9 Second,
103. Id (finding that Whitley, Estelle, and Resweber mandate inquiry into prison official's
state of mind when it is claimed that official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment); id at
2326 (finding that cited cases require that offending conduct be wanton); see also supra notes
37-55 and accompanying text (discussing cases cited above).
104. Justice Scalia wrote, "The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of
this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself .... " Id. at 2325.
105. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326 ("An intent requirement is either implicit in the word
'punishment' or is not .... "). To support that intent is implicit in punishment, Justice Scalia
quoted the following passage by Judge Posner:
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is
what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century .... [I]f [a]
guard accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we
consult the usage of 1791, 1866, or 1985.
Id. at 2325 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816 (1986)); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989) (finding terms "cruel"
and "unusual" suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 537-39 (1979) (contending there must be punitive intent to constitute punishment).
106. See supra note 105 (providing Court's interpretation of meaning of "punishment");
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991) (finding that intent requirement is derived from Eighth
Amendment's ban of cruel and unusual "punishment").
107. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325.
108. The framers of the Eighth Amendment intended to protect the convicted from torturous and barbarous methods of punishment. See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
664 (1977) ("An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court
construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was
designed to protect those convicted of crimes."); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Crueland Unusual
PunishmentInflicted:" The OrginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840-44 (1969) (tracing history
of Eighth Amendment and concluding that Framers intended to proscribe methods of
punishment).
109. The proposition that a cruel and unusual punishment determination should be made
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as Justice White argues in his concurring opinion, it is difficult to
attribute poor confinement conditions to the intent of any one defendant or group of defendants.1 0 Confinement conditions of this

type tend to aggregate over time, so that various officials will be
involved in the creation of poor conditions."' Furthermore, officials may disprove a showing of intent by arguing that substandard
conditions did not arise as a result of their intent, but instead were
caused by insufficient funding from the state legislature.' 1 2 Thus
from a pragmatic point of view, the intent requirement will likely be
difficult to prove.
b.

The derivation of the standard

After determining that the Eighth Amendment requires a state-ofmind inquiry, the Court proceeded to address the appropriate standard of culpability required in prison conditions cases. The Court
commented that case precedent established that offending conduct
must be wanton, 133 and reiterated the Whitley holding that the meaning of "wanton" varies with the type of conduct challenged. 1 4 Considering this shifting meaning of "wanton," the Court concluded
that the very high "malicious and sadistic" standard prescribed by
by examining the inflictor's state of mind has not escaped contention. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 585-88 (1979) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (finding there is no intent requirement in
punishment and inference of punishment may be drawn from severity of harm to individual);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting constitutional
standard should turn on character of punishment rather than motivation of person inflicting
pain); Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 979 (4th Cir. 1985) (contending that it is effect on
inmate population that determines constitutional violations); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d
189, 197 (11th Cir. 1979) (finding that if resulting pain is cruel and unusual, then Eighth
Amendment is violated regardless of intent or purpose of inflictor). Justice Brennan stated in
his concurring opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981):
In determining when prison conditions pass beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel and unusual, the "touchstone is the effect upon the imprisoned." ...
When "the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a
probability of recidivism and future incarceration," the court must conclude that the
conditions violate the Constitution.
Id at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.
Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).
110. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of concurring
opinion).
111. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (relating concern of concurrence and
of another commentator that attributing intent to prison officials for poor confinement conditions is problematic).
112. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing concurrence's concern over
funding issue); see also infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of
funding defense).
113. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991).
114. Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) to support conclusion that
wantonness does not have fixed meaning but must be determined based on consideration of
circumstances).
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Whitley did not apply.' 15 Instead, the Court found the "deliberate
indifference" standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble to be the appropriate level of wantonness required to be proved in Eighth
Amendment challenges to confinement conditions. 1 6 The Court
reasoned that the standards for addressing inadequate medical care
and harmful confinement conditions should be the same because
the two types of challenged conduct are not readily distinguishable.' 1 7 The Court then remanded the issue of whether the prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to the conditions at Hacking
8
Correctional Facility."1
Even if one disagrees that the Eighth Amendment imposes an intent requirement in challenges to prison conditions, it is difficult, in
light of other more stringent intent tests, to disagree with the
Court's holding that "deliberate indifference" is the correct intent
standard to apply. In fact, counsel for inmate Wilson argued that if
a state-of-mind inquiry is relevant at all in prison condition cases,
then deliberate indifference should be the standard. 119 The Court
could have chosen, as did the Sixth Circuit, 120 to apply Whitley's
"malicious and sadistic" standard. 12 1 This standard requires a
much higher showing of intent than does the deliberate indifference
standard and would create a difficult burden for prisoners to carry.
The Court's conclusion that deliberate indifference is the correct intent standard is therefore a victory in some sense for Wilson and for
other present and future inmates.
c.

The creation of a possible affirmative defense

In what may turn out to be a heavily quoted passage, the Court
stated that once it is established that challenged conduct is sufficiently harmful, then "whether [conduct] can be characterized as
115. Id; see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing Whitey standard). The
Court found that unlike the facts in Wilson, the riot situation in Whitley presented an emergency. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326 (describing need to act in haste during prison disturbance to protect safety of prison staff and inmates). In such an emergency situation,
wantonness is acting "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." See
id (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).

116.

Id; see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of

Estelle).

117. See Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2327 (noting that prisoner's medical care is just as much
condition of confinement as daily physical conditions).
118. Id. at 2328.
119. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 84, at 29-30. Counsel for petitioner also argued that if
deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard, then the standard would be met merely by
the existence of continuing harsh prison conditions. It at 25.
120. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
121. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing Whitley decision).
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'wanton' depends upon the constraints facing the official.' ' 122 By
predicating wantonness on the problems and difficulties facing
prison officials, the Court in Wilson created an apparent affirmative
defense to the state-of-mind requirement. For example, the Court
left open the possibility that prison officials could argue in their defense that harsh confinement conditions are due not to wanton conduct, but rather to constraints such as lack of funding, 123 or rapid
prison overcrowding. The Court failed to elaborate on the mechanics of such a defense, however, leaving the issue unresolved as to
which constraints preclude a finding of wantonness. 124
2.

Unconstitutionalconditions

After handing down the Eighth Amendment state-of-mind requirement for cruel and unusual punishment determinations, the
Court proceeded to dismantle the traditional "totality of circumstances" test. 12 5 The Wilson majority concluded that Rhodes v. Chapman did not articulate such a broad test.' 26 Instead, the Court held
that conditions are not cruel and unusual unless they deprive a prisoner of "a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise."' 2 7 Conditions may work in combination to deprive such a
need, but overall conditions in and of themselves cannot constitute
122. Wilson, I11 S.Ct. at 2326 (emphasis in original). The Court apparently derived this
proposition from Whitley v. Albers, which stated that the requirement to prove the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain should be applied with due regard for differences in the kind of
conduct challenged under the Eighth Amendment. See id (stating that Whitley teaches that
wantonness depends on constraints facing prison officials); see also supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Whitley case). These propositions, however, are not the same.
The Court in Whitley sought to determine the level of wantonness required under the Eighth
Amendment by considering the type of conduct challenged, and not, as the Court posited in
Wilson, whether wantonness existed at all considering the constraints on the officials.
123. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325 (noting that United States, as amicus curiae, suggested
good faith efforts defense based on fiscal constraints). The Court did not resolve the validity
of an affirmative defense derived from funding limits because the respondents did not raise
the defense. Id.
124. See infra notes 211-25 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Court's
finding in Wilson that determination of wantonness on part of prison officials depends on
constraints facing officials).
125. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 ("Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise
to the level of cruel and unusual punishment...." (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 84,
at 36)). For a discussion of the totality of circumstances test, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (explaining mechanics of test).
126. Wilson, I11 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court in Rhodes v. Chapman found that conditions of
confinement, "alone, or in combination" may rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
127. Wilson, 111 S.Ct. at 2327. In an opinion subsequent to Wilson, the Supreme Court
commented that "[w]ith respect to the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, Wilson announced no new rule." Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992). Considering the confusion in the courts created by the holding in Rhodes v. Chapman, see supra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing Rhodes opinion and lack of direction it provided courts), the Supreme Court's clarification of the objective criteria set forth in Rhodes
does operate as a new rule.
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cruel and unusual punishment. 28
The Court expressed no opinion as to the Sixth Circuit's assessment of the prison conditions at HCF and failed to affirm or reject
the lower court's finding that even if proved, inadequate cooling,
housing with mentally ill inmates, and overcrowding do not involve
the serious deprivation required by Rhodes.129 The Court, however,
did reject petitioner's argument that because each condition must
be considered as part of the overall conditions, the Sixth Circuit
erred by independently dismissing the inadequate cooling, housing
with mentally ill inmates, and overcrowding claims.' 3 0 The Court
concluded that because Rhodes does not stand for the broad proposition that overall conditions can violate the Eighth Amendment, indi3
vidual claims can fail the test in isolation.' '
By handing down this "single identifiable human need[s]" test for
evaluating the constitutionality of prison conditions, the Court effectively adopted the core conditions test.' 32 Both tests require that
challenged prison conditions deprive an inmate of at least one basic
human need. In the core conditions test, the needs are described as
adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.' 3 3 In the single identifiable human needs test, the
needs include adequate food, warmth, and exercise.' 3 4 The Court in
Wilson left the list of needs open for expansion. 3 5 Arguably, the
latter test should expand to include core-area needs because the
needs traditionally included in that test are both basic and "identifiable." In their applications, therefore, the two tests should be virtually indistinguishable.
C.

The Concurrence

Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Stevens, concurred in the judgment but disputed the find128. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 (noting that just because some conditions interact does
not mean that all prison conditions are "a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes").
129. d; see also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing conditions prohibited by Rhodes v. Chapman).

130. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
131. Id
132. This is more evident considering that the Court in Wilson cited the Ninth Circuit
opinions that formulated the core conditions test as defining the proper scope of Eighth
Amendment protection set forth in Rhodes v. Chapman. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 (citing
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 1982) and Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129,
1133 (9th Cir. 1981)).
133. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing core conditions test).
134. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
135. See id (making noninclusive list by referring to it as including needs "such as" food,
warmth, or exercise).
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ings of the majority.' 3 6 In his concurrence, Justice White first rejected the majority's classification of poor confinement conditions as
the infliction of pain not formally meted out as punishment.1 3 7 He
stated that Hutto v. Finney and Rhodes v. Chapman provided that confinement conditions were part of the punishment. 3 8s With confinement conditions being part of punishment, there only remained the
necessity to inquire into the objective severity of the conditions, and
not into the state of mind of prison officials.13 9 He noted that unlike
Eighth Amendment challenges to conduct not purporting to be
punishment, such as specific acts or omissions directed at individual
prisoners, the element of intent had not previously been required
in causes of action alleging unconstitutional confinement con14 0
ditions.
Justice White also rejected the Court's finding that Whitley v. Albers
established a state-of-mind requirement for Eighth Amendment
challenges to confinement conditions.' 4 ' In fact, he noted that
Whitley expressly supported the application of an objective standard
for confinement condition challenges.' 4 2 He made this conclusion
by observing that the Court in Whitley stated that there does not
have to be an express intent to inflict unnecessary pain to violate the
Eighth Amendment, and that harsh prison conditions may constitute cruel and unusual punishment because such conditions are part
of the penalty for inmates' offenses. 143 Although not elaborating on
the Whitley statement, Justice White apparently considered the statement to be a confirmation that harsh confinement conditions are
punishment rather than conduct and therefore require only an objective showing of severity to violate the Eighth Amendment.' 44
Furthermore, Justice White disputed the majority's reliance on
the dictum in Whitley which stated that inadvertence and error in
136. Id at 2328-31 (White, J., concurring).
137. See id at 2328 (White, J., concurring) (stating that Court's classification disregards
prior decisions that involved challenges to conditions of confinement).
138. See id at 2328, 2329-30 (White, J., concurring) (finding that Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978) "made clear that conditions of confinement are part of punishment that
is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny" and that Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348
(1981) made "crystal clear" that conditions of confinement challenges are to be treated like
Eighth Amendment challenges to formally imposed punishment).
139. See id at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (providing that appropriate standard of review
for challenges to punishment is inquiry into objective severity of conditions only).
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id
144. This analysis becomes clear later in the opinion when Justice White refuted the majority's contention that Whilley established confinement conditions as conduct not purporting
to be punishment. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's
interpretation of Whitley).
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good faith do not characterize conduct prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, even if the conduct occurred in connection with the
establishment of confinement conditions. 145 Rather than interpreting this dictum as firmly establishing conditions of confinement as
conduct and not punishment, he argued that "conduct," as used by
the Court in the Whitley dictum, referred only to conduct not purporting to be punishment and not to the harsh conditions of confinement referred to earlier in the opinion.146 Under this
interpretation, confinement conditions could be considered a part
of punishment rather than a product of post-incarceration conduct
by prison officials. This precluded the need to inquire into the state
of mind of prison officials to determine the existence of Eighth
Amendment violations.
Finally, Justice White noted two problems that might arise in attaching a state-of-mind requirement to Eighth Amendment challenges to confinement conditions.' 4 7 First, because confinement
conditions are typically the product of numerous prison officials' actions over long periods of time, 148 Justice White warned that it
would be difficult to identify the party or parties whose intent
should be examined. 14 9 Intent in this context is therefore not very
meaningful.' 50 Second, he warned that prison officials may be able
to defeat prisoners' actions by arguing that poor conditions arose as
a result of insufficient funding by a state legislature rather than by
any deliberate indifference on their part.' 5 ' Considering these
problems, Justice White feared that the deliberate indifference standard would result in a failure to address serious deprivations of pris145. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). The relevant portion of the text in Whitley is as follows:
To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety ....
It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good
faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of
confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
146. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
147. See id. 2330-31 (White, J., concurring) (discussing situations in which Court's intent
requirement may prove impossible to apply).
148. See id at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (noting that prison conditions are often result
of cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside prisons).
149. Id.
150. Id. As one commentator found, it is difficult to attribute the totality of prison conditions to any individual's deliberate choice. See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 422 (arguing that
even if intent is inferred by objective conditions, it is not clear whose conduct and state of
mind is at issue).
151. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330-31 (White, J., concurring).
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52

THE IMPLICATIONS

The reach of Wilson v. Seiter will be defined to a great extent
through the development of three factors. First, courts' definitions
of the "deliberate indifference" standard will play a central role in
Wilson analysis; second, determinations as to which "constraints" on
prison officials will preclude a finding of wantonness will be an important limiting factor; and third, interpretations of the scope of
"identifiable human needs" will delineate the breadth of the opinion. Each of these factors and their impacts on prison litigation are
considered below.15 3
152. See id at 2331 (White, J., concurring) (expressing concern that basic needs of prisoners "will go unredressed due to an unnecessary and meaningless search for 'deliberate
indifference' ").
153. The recent Supreme Court decision in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S.
Ct. 748 (1992), may also directly affect the impact of Wilson. In Rufo, the petitioner, who was
the county sheriff, filed a motion to modify a 1973 consent decree that required the building
of a new jail for pre-trial detainees and the housing of inmates in single occupancy cells. Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 756 (1992). In his proposed modification,
Rufo sought to permit "double bunking" in 197 of the jail's 453 cells. Id He argued that
changes in the law and in fact mandated the modifications. Id According to Rufo, the asserted change in law was that the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), held that double celing [bunking] was not unconstitutional per se. Id. The asserted
change in fact was the increase in the pre-trial detainee population. Id.
In analyzing the case, the Supreme Court was required to determine whether modification
requests should be reviewed under a "grievous wrong" standard or a "flexible" standard.
The "grievous wrong" standard provides that a consent decree may be modified when there is
"[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions ......
I at 757 (quoting United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). The
"flexible" standard, however, provides that a consent decree may be modified "if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtained at the time of issuance have changed, or new ones
have since arisen." Id. at 758 (quoting Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647
(1961)). The Court held that the modification requests of consent decrees in institutional
reform litigation should be reviewed under a flexible standard, and that the party seeking the
modification has the initial burden of meeting that standard. Id. at 760. The requesting party
may meet this burden by showing either a significant change in factual conditions or in law.
hI. Furthermore, the proposed change must be suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.
Id The Court noted, however, that to base the modification of a decree on a subsequent
decision that clarifies the law, the parties must have grounded their original agreement on a
misunderstanding of the governing law. I. at 763. The Court remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id at 765.
The effect of this decision on Wilson is significant for a number of reasons. First, Rufo may
give Wilson a retroactive effect. For instance, prison administrators operating under pre-Wil.
son consent decrees that require improvements in unconstitutional prison conditions may request modifications in the decrees on grounds that ison is a significant change in the law.
The administrators may argue, for example, that the prison conditions were originally
deemed unconstitutional on the basis of a "totality of circumstances" test, a test that is no
longer applicable for defining the scope of Eighth Amendment protection. Years of prison
reform could conceivably be negated under such a theory. Second, from a prospective point
of view, the availability of the flexible standard may encourage numerous requests to modify
post-Wilson consent decrees. Such requests could frustrate and delay the positive effects of
the original decrees. Moreover, the subsequent modifications, if granted, could provide a less
effective remedy to harsh prison conditions than the original plan. Perhaps most significantly,
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A. Defining "DeliberateIndiference"
Confusion abounds when attempts are made to distinguish degrees of culpability between the two extremes of negligence and intentional conduct.1 54 Nonetheless, this is precisely the task of the
courts in interpreting the meaning of "deliberate indifference," a
task that will largely determine the impact of Wilson. The term "deliberate indifference" is confusing and has a number of possible
meanings. 155 It will be up to the courts to position deliberate indifference on the culpability continuum between negligence and inten56
tional conduct.'
The impact of the deliberate indifference standard on prisoners'
rights will be directly related to where the courts place the term on
Rufo probably signals the beginning of a new era in prison litigation. The case shifts the
battleground of prison litigation from institutional reformation methodology to the dismantling of previously imposed prison reforms. This result is readily apparent in light of the
Justice Department's recent announcement that the Department will help some states modify
court-imposed consent decrees that require prison reforms. See Sharon LaFraniere, U.S. Shifts
on Prison Crowding, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at Al (discussing Justice Department's new
policy to attack decrees that are overly broad, particularly with regard to those specifying
prisoners' diets, exercise, and visitation rights and prison population caps).
154. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1986) (noting concern expressed by party
that meanings of terms such as "willful, wanton, reckless or gross negligence" have "left the
finest scholars puzzled" and conceding that meaning of these terms is elusive); see also Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n.10 (lst Cir. 1989) (observing that distinction between negligence, reckless or callous indifference, and intentional conduct can be elusive).
155. See Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1066 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that deliberate indifference is "not easily defined" and that there is "degree of inherent conflict between the two
words"); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that deliberate indifference is not "self-defining" and that courts have strugged to give it practical
meaning); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that deliberate
indifference is oxymoron that "evades rather than expresses precise meaning"), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 816 (1986). But see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 n.14 (1976) (asserting that
courts of appeals are in agreement with regard to deliberate indifference standard although
their terminology of what is sufficient varies).
156. The Restatement of Torts clarifies the degrees of culpability that exist on a continuum from negligence to intentional conduct. The Restatement notes that negligence becomes recklessness when the actor does or should realize that the risk of the conduct is out of
proportion with the utility of the conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 cmt. e
(1965). "As the disproportion between risk and utility increases, there enters into the actor's
conduct a degree of culpability which approaches and finally becomes indistinguishable from
that which is shown by conduct intended to invade similar interests." Id. Therefore, where
there is great disproportion between utility and risk, there is a tendency to assign conduct a
legal interpretation of intention to cause the harm. Id.
In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), the Supreme Court was faced with a similar task of
charting the area between negligence and intentional conduct to determine the culpability
threshold for allowing punitive damages in section 1983 cases. Some jurisdictions allowed
punitive damages in response to a showing of mere negligent conduct by the defendant. See
id. at 61-62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (providing cases). Others required a showing of intent
before punitive damages would be awarded. See id at 60 & n.3, 78 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (providing cases). The majority of the Court concluded that reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights was sufficient to allow a jury to consider awarding punitive
damages. ll at 51. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that there must be some degree of

bad faith or improper motive on the part of the defendant to justify the awarding of punitive
damages. Id. at 56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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If the standard is placed closer to in-

tentional conduct, then the adverse impact on prisoners' rights will
be greater because proving intent is a difficult task. If the standard

is placed closer to negligence, the adverse impact on prisoners'
rights will be less. The most likely interpretations of the term in the

context of culpable prison officials will be derived for the most part
from current and past Eighth Amendment case law, and a number

of these constructions are considered below.' 58
1.

Possible interpretations

a. Knowledge and a failure to act
It may be that deliberate indifference means prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they know of harmful confinement conditions but fail to act on that knowledge to remedy the
situations.' 5 9 Indeed, a number of lower federal courts have interpreted the standard in this way.' 60 Rather than calling for a strong
157. As an illustration, consider Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). In this case,
the Supreme Court addressed the level of culpability required to violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 346. The Court denied relief to an injured
inmate, reasoning that prison official negligence cannot rise to the level of a due process
violation. l at 347-48. Justice Blackmun disagreed, however, arguing that when a state
strips an inmate of the ability for self-protection, a prison official's negligence in protecting
the inmate can amount to a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Davidson thus illustrates how requiring differing levels of culpability can directly affect the constitutional rights of prisoners.
158. A prison official is not the only possible defendant in prison condition cases brought
by inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra note 81 (providing text of section 1983). An
inmate can seek redress under section 1983 from prison guards, municipalities, or governing
officials in their personal capacities. See supra note 81 (discussing section 1983 suits and parties that can be held liable under statute). Additionally, prisoners can seek injunctive relief
under section 1983 from state officials in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (allowing section 1983 suits against state officials for
injunctive relief).
For the purposes of clarity and economy, Parts III and IV of this Note will consider the
defending parties to be prison officials. This assumption comports with typical confinement
conditions cases, which often name prison officials as defendants. See, e.g., Moore v.
Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir.) (litigating conditions claim against former warden of
prison), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 97 (1991); Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1990)
(analyzing poor conditions charge brought against director of Department of Corrections and
other prison employees); Milier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990) (naming group of
wardens, prison administrators, and employees as defendants in confinement conditions
lawsuit).
159. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 22-23 (proposing
that knowledge of conditions and failure to act should satisfy deliberate indifference
standard).
160. See, e.g., Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1064 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that prison officials must be aware of incidences of suicide in lockups before liability
for failure to prevent suicide under section 1983 can be established); Williams v. Griffin, 952
F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1991) ("To demonstrate deliberate indifference, [a defendant] must
show that the Prison Officials had knowledge of the conditions that are the subject of the
complaint."); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 937 F.2d 984, 998 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting deliberate indifference to mean awareness of objectively cruel conditions and failure to
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showing of intent, this interpretation requires only a showing of a
prison official's actual knowledge of serious harm and subsequent
failure to act on the harm. 6 1 Knowledge may also be inferred
under this interpretation if the confinement information was suffi162
ciently obvious to prison officials.
In this formulation, deliberate indifference is not far removed
from administrative negligence. 163 The analysis shifts away from intent and focuses only on what the prison officials knew and what
they should have done to address the problem. 64 A prisoner, for
instance, could meet the state-of-mind requirement under this forremedy them); Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[D]efendants
acted with deliberate indifference if they possessed actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm could be inferred
from their failure to prevent it."); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir.
1990) (providing that to establish deliberate indifference, inmates' decedent must meet three
elements: (1) defendants had actual knowledge of specific harm or risk that was so pervasive
that knowledge can be inferred; (2) defendants failed to take reasonable measures to avert
harm; and (3) defendants' failure to take such measures in light of their actual or inferred
knowledge justifies liability for attendant consequences of conduct, even though unintended);
Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of
section 1983 action because prison officials did not know of inmate's tendency toward suicide); Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing trial court finding
of section 1983 liability because there was no evidence that parole officer actually knew corrections officer intended to commit constitutional violation); Murphy v. United States, 653
F.2d 637, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding deliberate indifference can be inferred from evidence that danger was sufficiently obvious to apprise officials and officials nevertheless failed
to act); Arce v. Miles, No. 85 Civ. 5810 (SWK), 1991 WL 123952, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 28,
1991) (finding deliberate indifference standard met where prison officials supplied ear plugs
to workers and guards to protect them from noisy work conditions yet failed to supply inmates
with ear plugs).
161. A failure to act is sufficient to render a prison official liable in a deliberate indifference action because prison officials have special duty to take care of imprisoned and therefore
largely powerless persons. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (recognizing
duty of care of officials who oversee incarcerated individuals).
162. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (proposing
as part of three-part test stated in note 160, supra, that deliberate indifference requires knowledge which can be inferred if risk is pervasive or substantial); Cortes-Quinones v. JimenezNettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.) (stating that deliberate indifference may exist in presence of "acts or omissions so dangerous ... that a defendant's 'knowledge of [a large] ... risk
can be inferred' ") (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821
F.2d 408,417 (7th Cir.) (finding that deliberate indifference may be inferred if risk of harm is
pervasive and serious problem of substantial dimensions), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987);
Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that deliberate indifference can be inferred if danger is sufficiently obvious to apprise officials).
163. As the First Circuit stated, "When a supervisory official is placed on actual notice of a
prisoner's need[s] . . . 'administrative negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference ....... Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting West v. Rowe, 448
F. Supp. 58, 60 (N.D. II. 1978)), quoted in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that failure of
prison officials to remedy conditions identified in inspection reports provided sufficient basis
for claim that officials had actual knowledge of conditions); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389,
392-93 (4th Cir. 1987) (focusing on what prison officials knew and should have done to modify and prepare room for handicapped prisoner rather than on intent of prison officials).
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mulation by presenting evidence that he or she notified officials
orally or in writing of the conditions and that the officials failed to
act on the notification. 16 5 Thus, a prisoner could prove deliberate
indifference without necessarily proving the subjective motivations
of the prison officials.
This formulation of deliberate indifference dilutes the implicit
Eighth Amendment intent requirement found by the Court in Wilson.' 66 That is, the inquiry into the prison official's state of mind is
minimized. On the continuum between negligence and intentional
conduct, therefore, deliberate indifference as knowledge plus failure
to act appears to be positioned closer to negligence than to intentional conduct. Under this formulation, the impact of the standard
on the rights of prisoners would likely be slight. 167
An issue related to this interpretation of deliberate indifference,
and indeed to any interpretation that requires a showing of an official's failure to act in response to a notification of harmful conditions, is whether prison officials could conceivably negate the failure
to act element by making a minimal effort to remedy inadequacies.' 68 Some action, however, has not necessarily sufficed in the
courts to date.16 9 The officials' remedial actions must be "significant" according to some courts and "reasonable" according to
165. See McGill v. Duckworth, 9.44 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A prisoner normally
proves actual knowledge ofimpending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials
about a specific threat to his safety."); Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 647-48, 652 (7th Cir.
1988) (finding officials had knowledge of danger due in part to oral and written requests for
protection from prisoner and that proof of knowledge should therefore have precluded district court's granting of summary judgment for defendant); Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d
47, 50 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding prisoners' allegations of harm sufficient to state claim where
repeated complaints about confinement conditions had not produced results), vacated on other
grounds, 858 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1988). But see Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1986) (denying relief under Fourteenth Amendment to prisoner injured by inmate after prisoner sent note asking for protection to prison official and official failed to respond, finding
that official's failure to act on note was lack of due care but not abusive governmental
conduct).
166. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (finding intent requirement implicit in word "punishment" in Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
167. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 22-25, 26 n.27
(predicting that if deliberate indifference is interpreted as knowledge and omission to act, it is
unlikely that outcome of more serious prison cases would change).
168. See Wilson, I11 S. Ct. at 2331 (White, J.,concurring) ("[S]eriously inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated from constitutional challenge because officials managing the institution have exhibited a conscientious concern for ameliorating its problems and
have made efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to that end." (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 19)).
169. See LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 392 (4th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's
dismissal of section 1983 action against prison officials who delayed "significant attempt" to
modify toilet facilities for handicapped inmate); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 44, at 17-19 (arguing that some action by prison officials in response to
deficient conditions should not preclude Eighth Amendment violation).
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b. Inexcusable lack of knowledge
Actual knowledge of substandard conditions may not be required
to establish deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials.
This is possible in at least two scenarios. First, prison officials may
purposely shield themselves from knowledge of severe conditions.1 7 1 Such purposeful shielding may be used to infer knowledge
72
and will likely give rise to a deliberate indifference determination. 1
Second, a prison official's lack of knowledge of harmful conditions
may be so offensive that it also rises to the level of deliberate indifference. 7 3 In this instance, the official's unawareness of harm is
troubling because lack of knowledge itself may indicate outrageous
insensitivity and flagrant indifference.1 74 In this scenario, courts
frame the deliberate indifference standard in language reminiscent
of negligence, stating namely that officials either "knew or should
have known" of the harm. 175 Under this interpretation, the deliberate indifference standard is significantly removed from the Eighth
170. Compare Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that failure by prison officials to take "significant steps" is element of deliberate indifference) with Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding deliberate
indifference may not exist where defendant takes reasonable measures to avoid known or
inferred harm) and Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir.) (upholding liability of
prison officials who failed to respond reasonably to risk of inmate assault), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
928 (1988).
171. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 23 (suggesting that
actual knowledge need not be shown for deliberate indifference when officials shield themselves from information).
172. See McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Suspecting that something is true but shutting your eyes for fear of what you will learn satisfies scienter requirements... [because] [b]eing an ostrich involves a level of knowledge sufficient for conviction
of crimes requiring specific intent.") (citations omitted).
173. The court in Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987), found
deliberate indifference on such an occasion in the context of prison safety:
Deliberate indifference occurs if there is an obvious unreasonable risk of violent
harm to a prisoner... which is known to be present or should have been known, and
the District through its employees who knew or should have known of the risk were
outrageously insensitive or flagrantly indifferent to the situation and took no significant action to correct or avoid the risk of harm to the prisoner ....
Id. at 1058 (quoting Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 639, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
174. See supra note 173 (providing language of court discussing meaning of deliberate
indifference).
175. See, e.g., Elliott v. Cheshire County, 940 F.2d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The key to
deliberate indifference in a prison suicide case is whether the defendants knew, or reasonably
should have known, of the detainee's suicidal tendencies."); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991) (maintaining that liability exists where custodial
official knew or should have known of strong likelihood of prison suicide); Morgan v. District
of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating deliberate indifference occurs
when unreasonable risk is or should have been known by officials); Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d
778, 781 (8th Cir. 1981) (affirming section 1983 judgment against prison guard because there
was sufficient evidence officer knew or should have known of threat to prisoner), aft'd, 461
U.S. 30 (1983).
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Amendment intent requirement found by the Court in Wilson. Once
again, the term is placed closer to negligence than to intentional
conduct on the culpability continuum. Thus, the impact of the standard handed down in Wilson is cushioned under this formulation to
the benefit of the prisoner.
To be sure, simple negligence will not suffice in an Eighth
Amendment challenge to prison conditions. 176 Courts will probably
limit findings of deliberate indifference when prison officials actually
lack knowledge of harmful conditions to circumstances when prison
officials deliberately shield themselves from knowledge or are disturbingly unaware of the harmful conditions.
c. Recklessness
A number of courts have equated deliberate indifference with
recklessness.' 77 Unfortunately, this equation is of little help in understanding the potential impact of the deliberate indifference standard. Recklessness is as amorphous a concept as deliberate
indifference.' 78 It is comprised of varying levels and degrees. 179 In176. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding that violations of
Eighth Amendment require more than ordinary lack of care); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1025 (3d Cir. 1991) (defining "should have known" standard as more
than negligence but less than subjective appreciation of risk); Givens v.Jones, 900 F.2d 1229,
1232 (8th Cir. 1990) (asserting that Eighth Amendment violations require more than "mere
acts of negligence on part of prison officials and employees"); Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956,
958 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating Eighth Amendment challenges require showing greater than
.mere negligence or oversight").
177. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 358 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that prisoners must prove recklessness or deliberate indifference in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (equating recklessness with deliberate indifference); Desrosiers v.
Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[R]equisite state of mind.., can aptly be described
as 'recklessness,' it is recklessness not in the tort-law sense but in the appreciably stricter
criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable.") (citations omitted); Marsh v. Am, 937 F.2d 1056, 1069-70 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting simple negligence as standard for deliberate indifference and adopting "fairly high threshold of
liability"); Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1991) (defining deliberate
indifference as "intentional or criminally reckless conduct"); Givens v.Jones, 900 F.2d 1229,
1234 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying deliberate indifference or reckless disregard as standard for
inmate's Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of confinement); Harris v. Thigpen, 941
F.2d 1495, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1991) (stating that medical care provided to prisoners only violates
Eighth Amendment when it is "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock
the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness") (quoting Rogers v. Evans, 792
F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986)); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990)
(providing that deliberate indifference to inmates' medical needs may be demonstrated by
actual intent or reckless disregard); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d
Cir. 1988) (stating that deliberate indifference standard is met where prison officials "act with
reckless indifference" toward known risk of inmate suicide), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
178. See Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n.10 (1st Cir. 1989) (referring to recklessness
as "gray area" between negligence and intentional conduct and discussing possible levels of
recklessness).
179. See Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495-96 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding difference between tort recklessness and varying levels of criminal recklessness); Germany,
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deed, "recklessness" has been defined as willfulness, wantonness,
carelessness, or negligence.18 0 The impact of interpreting deliberate indifference as recklessness, therefore, will depend on a specific
court's proscribed level and degree of recklessness. Two major
levels of recklessness found by courts to define deliberate indifference are considered below.
The Seventh Circuit and courts thereunder have concluded in a
number of decisions that conduct only reaches the level of deliberate indifference when it is criminally reckless. 18 ' To be deliberately
indifferent in this formulation, prison officials must know of the high
degree of risk in their actions or inactions, rather than merely acting
868 F.2d at 18 n.10 (observing that tortious recklessness may be gross negligence or lesser
form of intentional conduct).
180. Blacks Law Dictionary defines "reckless" as follows:
Not recking; careless, heedless, inattentive; indifferent to consequences. According
to circumstances it may mean desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or it may mean
only careless, inattentive, or negligent. For conduct to be "reckless" it must be such
as to evince disregard of, or indifference to, consequences, under circumstances in-

volving danger to life or safety to others, although no harm was intended.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990).

181. See, e.g., Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1991) (defining
deliberate indifference as criminal recklessness in inmates' Eighth Amendment challenge to
cold prison conditions); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir. 1990) (maintaining that
prisoner must prove officials acted deliberately or recklessly in criminal sense to meet deliberate indifference standard); Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding actions
of prison officials must be deliberate or reckless in criminal sense); Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d
789, 794 (7th Cir.) (rejecting application of recklessness in sense of tort law and finding that
deliberate indifference is recklessness in criminal sense), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988);
Shockley v.Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (establishing that Eighth Amendment
is violated only by pain inflicted deliberately or recklessly in criminal sense); Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding Eighth Amendment can be violated
only by deliberate or reckless conduct in criminal sense), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986);
Thomas v. Cabanaw, No. S90-123 (RDP), 1991 WL 183868, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 1991)
(providing that inmate challenging deficiencies in personal safety at prison must prove prison
officials acted recklessly in criminal sense to establish deliberate indifference); Kimble v.
O'Leary, No. 89 C. 2033, 1990 WL 129520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1990) (finding criminal
recklessness defines deliberate indifference in challenges to inadequacies in inmate safety).
Criminal recklessness has been defined as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when [s]he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from [her] conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to [her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1962). Despite its use of criminal recklessness
to define the general deliberate indifference standard, the Seventh Circuit however has applied the repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies formulation of deliberate indifference, see infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (discussing formulation), in class action
suits seeking injunctive relief for inadequate medical care situations. See, e.g., Murphy v. Lane,
833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that deliberate indifference may be indicated by
repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1254
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying deliberate indifference as repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies test), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th
Cir. 1983) (determining that repeated acts of negligent medical care constitute deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1217 (1984).
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or failing to act in a highly risky manner without knowing or unreasonably not knowing of the risk.1 82 In the context of criminal recklessness, knowledge of risk can be inferred by the extreme
dangerousness of an act.' 8 3 Considering that such awareness of

high risk must be present when the prison official deliberately acts
or fails to act, this form of recklessness or deliberate indifference
takes on characteristics more akin to intentional conduct than to
negligence.
Criminal recklessness, however, exists in varying degrees.' 8 4 One
Seventh Circuit decision, Duckworth v. Franzen,18 5 equated deliberate
indifference with the highest degree of criminal recklessness, that
which is appropriate for second degree murder.' 8 6 The court noted
that conduct that is wrongful, deliberate, and very dangerous
manifests such recklessness. 18 7 Deliberate indifference in this sense
182. See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985) (defining criminal recklessness as "actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it."),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986), quoted with approvalin Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 n.7
(7th Cir. 1990).
183. See Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that criminal recklessness " 'implies an act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of the risk can be inferred
denied, 479
.... ') (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
U.S. 816 (1986)); Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir.) (noting that criminally reckless
acts import danger so great that knowledge of danger can be inferred), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1061 (1988).
184. See Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing varying levels of criminal recklessness from reckless endangerment to second degree
murder).
denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
185. 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
186. See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
816 (1986). In Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit endorsed criminal recklessness as the deliberate
indifference standard. Id. The court described criminal recklessness by presenting the example of a defendant choking his victim and intending to seriously injure him but killing him
instead. Il at 652. In this circumstance, the homicide is downgraded from first degree murder to second degree murder. Id.The court continued by stating, "As this example suggests,
recklessness in the criminal law implies an act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of
the risk can be inferred." Id.
It is unclear whether the subsequent Seventh Circuit cases that cited Duckworth approvingly
and purported to apply deliberate indifference as criminal recklessness intended to impose
such a high standard. None of the subsequent decisions definitively supported a second degree murder level of criminal recklessness. One case, however, in describing the deliberate
indifference standard with regard to medical needs, cited as an example of deliberate indifference a doctor injecting a prisoner with penicillin after the inmate informed the doctor he was
denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988);
allergic to it. Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir.), cert.
see also Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.) (holding that prison doctor inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment on inmate when he gave inmate penicillin shot after inmate informed him he was allergic to penicillin), vacated and remanded on otherground sub nom. Cannon
v. Thomas, 419 U.S. 813 (1974). This example would appear to comport with the second
degree murder level of criminal recklessness. Cf.Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211,
1219 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding pertinent degree of recklessness for Due Process Clause case to
be when actor does not care whether other person lives or dies despite knowing that there is
significant risk of death).
187. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652. The Model Penal Code defines criminally reckless murder as homicide that "is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme
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is indistinguishable from intentional conduct on the culpability continuum. The impact of such a formulation is to greatly restrict a
prisoner's ability to successfully challenge the conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has nevertheless cited Duckworth's formulation of deliberate indifference
approvingly.188
Other courts have interpreted deliberate indifference in Eighth

Amendment cases to be closer to tortious recklessness. 189 Tortious
recklessness may be a heightened form of negligence such as gross

negligence, or a lower form of intent.1 90 Recently, the Supreme
Court suggested that gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference.'91 Thus, recklessness for the purpose of definindifference to the value of human life." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft
1962).
188. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (citing Duckworth's equation ofdeliberate indifference to criminal recklessness for proposition that inferences may be drawn to
determine if official's infliction of harm was tantamount to knowing willingness that harm
would occur).
189. See, e.g., Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming reckless disregard standard as elaboration of deliberate indifference); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d
1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that deliberate indifference occurs if prison official or
municipality "disregards a known or obvious risk that is very likely to result in the violation of
a prisoner's constitutional rights"); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding inmate has viable Eighth Amendment issue if prison official acted intentionally or with
reckless disregard of inmate's right to be free from risk of harm); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d
469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding reckless disregard of prisoner's rights may be shown when
pervasive risk of harm exists and prison officials fail to respond to that risk). The court in
Berry derived its definition of recklessness from tort law, citing PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 34, at 213 (5th ed. 1984) (defining reckless conduct to be conduct "in disregard of
a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences"). Beny, 900 F.2d at 1496. Subsequently, the court rejected the high degree of criminal recklessness required by the Seventh Circuit in Duckworth. See id (finding proof required
by Duckworth test is "too high a standard," given Supreme Court's distinction between Estelle
and Whitley).
190. See Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 n.10 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that recklessness
can be akin to gross negligence or to lesser form of intent and choosing latter as proper
interpretation for Due Process purposes); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th
Cir. 1988) (asserting that courts sometimes treat reckless infliction of injuries as equivalent to
intentional conduct); see also Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (observing that one common understanding of recklessness in tort law equates it with gross negligence), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1988). The Restatement of Torts states that there are two
types of reckless conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1977). In one
type, the actor knows or has reason to know of the high degree of risks in the action. l In
the other type, the actor does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risks in the actions,
but a reasonable person would have. Id. The latter formulation is based on reasonableness
and is similar to recklessness in the gross negligence sense.
191. In Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of determining a municipality's section 1983 liability for failing to properly train police
officers, it must be shown that the municipality's failure to act stemmed from deliberate indifference on the part of governmental officials to the rights of those who come in contact with
the police. Id. at 388-89 & n.7. The Court commented that some lower courts applied gross
negligence as the proper standard in failure to train cases, but that the more common rule was
to apply the deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 388 n.7. The Court, therefore, considered the two standards to be different. Accordingly, recklessness as gross negligence would

1376

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1339

ing Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference will likely be
required by courts to be of a form closer to intent than to negligence.' 9 2 In this formulation, as with criminal recklessness, prison
officials would have to appreciate the high degree of risk engendered by their actions or inactions rather than merely act or fail to
act in a high-risk manner before liability would attach.193
If courts choose to interpret deliberate indifference as criminal or
tortious recklessness, they place the standard closer to intent than to
negligence on the culpability continuum.' 94 Accordingly, it will be
more difficult for prisoners to successfully challenge their confinement conditions than if the standard had more closely approximated
negligence. If courts choose to interpret deliberate indifference as a
high degree of criminal recklessness, the deliberate indifference
standard will be very difficult for prisoners to meet, much to the
detriment of their rights.
d.

Repeated negligent acts or systematic and gross deficiencies

A number of lower court cases since Estelle v. Gamble have interpreted the deliberate indifference standard to be met by evidence of
repeated negligent acts that disclose a pattern of prison officials'
conduct, or by proof of systematic and gross deficiencies in prison
staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that effectively deny inmates adequate care. 195 The first part of this interpretation returns
not be equivalent to deliberate indifference. This suggestion conflicts with a number of federal court decisions that equate deliberate indifference with gross negligence. See, e.g., Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339-40 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting deliberate indifference may be
reckless disregard or gross negligence); Gibralter v. City of New York, 612 F. Supp. 125, 133
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that inmate has burden of proving defendants acted with gross negligence or deliberate indifference); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1110 (E.D.N.C. 1984)
(stating that liability attaches to officials when their action or inaction amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference).
192. See Berry, 900 F.2d at 1495-96 (citing Canton and maintaining that deliberate indifference requires greater degree of fault than gross negligence). In Berry, the Tenth Circuit propounded a degree of recklessness more closely related to intent. See id. at 1496 (holding that
officials act with deliberate indifference if their conduct disregards known or obvious risks that
are very likely to result in violation of prisoners' rights); see also supra note 190 (delineating
different degrees of recklessness).
193. See supra notes 177-92 and accompanying text (discussing criminal and tortious degrees of recklessness).
194. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (" 'Recklessness' is a proxy for intent .... "); see also supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions in degrees of culpability between negligence and intentional conduct).
195. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1506 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that HIVpositive inmates may establish prison officials' deliberate indifference to inmate medical needs
by showing systemic and gross deficiencies or repeated negligent acts in provision of medical
services); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding inmates challenging
exposure to tuberculosis may establish deliberate indifference by evidence of repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies); Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that deliberate indifference may be indicated by repeated negligent acts or systematic
deficiencies); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding deliberate
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courts' attention to prison officials' negligence-this time, however,
negligence is viewed in the aggregate. In some sense, it is a "totality-of-negligence" standard. The number of acts of negligence necessary to give rise to a determination of deliberate indifference is
open for debate,' 9 6 and the outcome of this debate will be a factor
in determining the impact of this interpretation on confinement
condition cases.
The second part of this interpretation-proof of systematic deficiencies within the prison environment-is indeed curious. The criterion appears to disregard the state-of-mind requirement entirely
and to revisit instead the totality of circumstances test. 19 7 Deliberate indifference is consequently framed in language regarding objective conditions rather than prison official culpability, l9 8 and the
standard is therefore no longer positioned on the culpability continuum at all.' 99 Conceivably, a lower court could find prison officials
indifference in inadequate medical care case as repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiendes standard), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th
Cir. 1983) (determining meaning of deliberate indifference in inadequate medical care context), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1217 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (discussing meaning of deliberate indifference in prisoner
class action suits); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding series of incidents
closely related in time amounts to deliberate indifference and noting systematic deficiencies
make suffering inevitable); Gilland v. Owens, 718 F. Supp. 665, 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (upholding interpretation of repeated negligent acts and systematic deficiencies as deliberate indifference); Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding systematic
deficiencies at prison established deliberate indifference in case challenging overall conditions
of inmate safety), aft'd, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990). Some courts discussing this formulation
refer to "systemic" rather than "systematic" deficiencies. Harris,941 F.2d at 1505; Ramos, 639
F.2d at 575.
196. Terms such as "repeated" or "series" of negligent acts showing a "pattern" of
prison official conduct, see cases cited supranote 195, provide clues as to the number of negligent acts deemed necessary to meet the standard, but they are far from definitive. Apparently, at least two negligent acts will suffice, but most likely more are required. When
considering whether the "repeated" or "series" of negligent acts rises to the level of deliberate indifference, the amount of time between the acts is likely to be a factor. See Todaro v.
Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that acts must be "closely related in time").
197. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing totality of circumstances
test).
198. Cf. Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding prison's resources and personnel so overtaxed that prisoners' suffering was serious and inevitable), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984). This case interpreted the deliberate indifference standard in
another portion of the opinion regarding inadequate medical care. Id at 272. The case did
not apply the standard to challenges of confinement conditions.
199. A passage from Fisher v. Koehler can be used to illustrate how far removed this understanding is from subjective prison official culpability. After concluding that systematic deficiencies at a prison constituted deliberate indifference, the court in Fisher stated:
This finding should not be interpreted as casting any cloud on the obvious sincerity
and competence of Commissioner Koehler, then-Warden Garvey, and many of the
other officials from whom we heard testimony. A finding of"deliberate indifference"
from evidence of systematic deficiencies in prison conditions is not inconsistent with
findings that individual officials or staff members at an institution attempt in good
faith to do a good job.
Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1562 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990).
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deliberately indifferent, as required by the Court in Wilson, without
inquiring into the state of mind of the officials. This result brings
the law back to at least the pre-Wilson stage. Under an interpretation approximating a totality of circumstances test, the decision in
Wilson would have little or no impact on a prisoner's cause of action
challenging confinement conditions.
There are, however, potential problems with arguing in a confinement condition case that deliberate indifference should be interpreted according to this formulation. First, previous cases
interpreting the standard by examining repeated negligent acts or
deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, and procedures have
arisen almost exclusively in the context of class action suits seeking
injunctive relief.20 0 Furthermore, most of the cases applying the
formulation have involved inadequate medical care claims. 20 ' It
may be contended, therefore, that the formulation should not apply
in cases that do not match these characteristics. 20 2
2. Predictingthe correctformulation
It is difficult to predict at this point which, if any, of the aforementioned formulations of deliberate indifference will emerge as the
"correct" interpretation. To date there are no steadfast rules for
applying any particular formulation. There are, however, a few
trends that may give some indication as to future developments.
The trends relate to the location in which an action is brought, the
type of conduct challenged, and the nature of the relief sought.
For example, the Seventh Circuit regularly equates deliberate in200. See supra note 195 (providing cases). But see Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 614
(7th Cir. 1990). In Kelley, the inmate plaintiff brought an Eighth Amendment claim alleging
that prison administrators were deliberately indifferent in treating his chronic foot problem.
Id. at 614. The inmate alleged deliberate indifference under two theories: first, that prison
doctors intentionally aggravated his medical condition, and second, that the doctors were
guilty of repeated, long-term negligent treatment. Id. at 616. The Seventh Circuit questioned
the repeated negligent acts theory by noting that it had only found deliberate indifference
under the theory in class action suits. See id. at 617 (citing Wellman, 715 F.2d at 272). The
court proceeded, however, to give a luke-warm affirmation of the theory in this context, finding that relief should not be foreclosed in this single plaintiff case, at least not at the summary
judgment stage, under the repeated acts theory. Id.
201. See supra note 195 (providing cases).
202. To conclude, however, that this interpretation of deliberate indifference should apply in the context of inadequate medical care but not in the context of poor confinement
conditions would be to promulgate a double standard. After all, the Court in Wilson extended
the deliberate indifference standard to confinement condition cases partly because the wrongs
in those cases, i.e. pain and suffering, could not be distinguished from the wrongs in inadequate medical care cases. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing Court's derivation of deliberate indifference standard). Arguably, therefore, the repeated negligent acts
or systematic deficiencies interpretation of deliberate indifference should apply to Eighth
Amendment challenges in both medical care and confinement conditions cases.
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difference in nonclass action suits with criminal recklessness. 20 3
Prisoners challenging conditions of confinement in this circuit
should be prepared to meet this rigorous standard. On the other
hand, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have specifically rejected
20 4 Most
this approach and will likely apply a less rigorous standard.
importantly, however, the Supreme Court appears to approve of the
Seventh Circuit's formulation. In two relatively recent major prison
cases, the Court has approvingly cited the Seventh Circuit decision
that originated the criminal recklessness interpretation. 20 5 Considering this sanction of the Seventh Circuit's formulation and the
Court's consistent deference to prison administrators over the past
fifteen years, 20 6 it appears likely that the Court will adopt the stringent criminal recklessness standard if an opportunity is presented.
As for the type of conduct challenged and the relief sought, courts
most often tend to apply the repeated negligent acts or systematic
deficiencies formulation in Eighth Amendment class action challenges seeking injunctive relief to inadequate medical care. 20 7 Furthermore, courts tend to apply the recklessness or knowledge plus a
failure to act formulation in challenges seeking damages for inadequate prison safety conditions. 20 8 Beyond these two trends, however, a consistent pattern has yet to emerge. For example, courts
203. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (providing Seventh Circuit cases interpreting deliberate indifference standard).
204. See DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 532-33 (8th Cir. 1990) (following Berry v. City of
Muskogee and rejecting criminal recklessness interpretation of deliberate indifference while
accepting deliberate indifference as either recklessness or repeated negligent acts); Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting Duckworth's criminal
recklessness standard and applying deliberate indifference in form akin to knowledge plus
failure to act).
205. See Wilson v. Seiter, II S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991) (quoting and agreeing with Seventh Circuit's discussion in Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (1985) of conduct proscribed
by Eighth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (sanctioning Duckworth's
equation of deliberate indifference with criminal recklessness).
206. See supra note 33 (providing Supreme Court cases rejecting prisoners' challenge to
prison officials' actions). But see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1002 (1992) (reversing
court of appeals decision that denied relief to prisoner because he suffered no "significant
injury") (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990)).
207. See supra note 195 (providing cases applying deliberate indifference standard as repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies test in Eighth Amendment challenges to inadequate medical care).
208. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying
deliberate indifference in form similar to knowledge plus failure to act in case challenging
prisoner's conditions of personal safety); Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 765-66 (8th Cir.)
(upholding jury instruction that stated deliberate indifference may be shown by prison officials' acting with reckless disregard to inmate's risk of being assaulted), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
928 (1988); Murphy v. United States, 653 F.2d 637, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding deliberate indifference can be inferred from evidence that danger to inmate's safety was sufficiently
obvious to apprise officials who failed to act); Thomas v. Cabanaw, No. S90-123 (RDP), 1991
WL 183868, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 1991) (providing that inmate challenging deficiencies in
personal safety at prison must prove prison officials acted recklessly in criminal sense to establish deliberate indifference).
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evaluating the constitutionality of confinement conditions relating
to inmate health, hygiene, or shelter have applied varying interpretations of the deliberate indifference test. 209 A possibility exists that
courts will follow the Supreme Court's analysis in Wilson and equate
challenges to inadequate medical care with challenges to confinement conditions. 210 If this is done, courts may regularly apply the
repeated negligent acts or systematic deficiencies interpretation to
confinement condition cases.
B. Determining Which "Constraints" On Prison Officials Will Preclude a
Finding of Wantonness
The Court in Wilson stated that whether conduct can be character-

ized as wanton depends on the constraints facing prison officials. 211
Because conduct must be wanton to violate the Eighth Amendment,
recognition of the types of constraints that will preclude a wantonness finding is crucial to understanding the impact of the deci.sion.2 12 It is unclear, however, exactly what kinds of preclusive
constraints the majority envisioned. As a result, it will be largely up

to the lower courts to make this determination and to thereby define
the impact of the decision.
One constraint that prison officials are likely to present as a defense after Wilson is a lack of funding.213 For example, a prison official may attempt to refute charges of deliberate indifference to
harmful prison conditions by affirmatively showing inability to receive sufficient funding from the state legislature to remedy the conditions, despite repeated efforts to obtain such funding.21 4 The
209. See, e.g., Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 937 F.2d 984, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting deliberate indifference in challenge to overcrowded conditions as knowledge

plus failure to remedy conditions); Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
1991) (defining deliberate indifference as criminal recklessness in inmate's challenge to cold
prison conditions); Givens v.Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1990) (equating deliberate
indifference with reckless disregard in inmate's Eighth Amendment challenge to noise and
fumes at prison); Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding
systemic deficiencies at prison established deliberate indifference in case challenging overall
safety of inmates in prison shelter), aft'd, 902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990).
210. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (finding no significant distinction
between claims alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate conditions of
confinement).
211. Id. at 2326; see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing Court's finding
that constraints on officials are relevant to wantonness determination).
212. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326 (stating that previous cases held that offending conduct
must be wanton).
213. The concurring opinion in Wilson raises this concern. See id. at 2330-31 (White, J.,
concurring) (stating that majority decision leaves open possibility that prison officials could
simply show lack of funds from state legislature to disprove deliberate indifference).
214. See idL at 2326 (noting suggestion by United States as amicus curiae that state-ofmind requirement might give rise to lack of funding defense). Cf Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 358 (1981) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("[C]onscientious prison officials are '[caught]

19921

WILSON V.SEITER

1381

efforts to obtain funding, under this defense, would demonstrate in
theory the prison official's innocent state of mind and therefore preclude a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation. In this situation,
it is a prison official's inability to obtain funding that precludes a
finding of wantonness, and insufficient funding ultimately excuses
the harmful confinement conditions.
The Court appeared to leave the validity of this fiscal constraint
defense open by finding that such constraints cannot change the
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment, 215 although the Court
refused to address the issue fully because the prison officials had not
advanced the defense.216 The mere fact that the Court flirted with
the validity of the defense is both surprising and troubling, however.
It is surprising because there are a substantial number of circuit and
district court cases that have specifically rejected a fiscal constraint
defense in Eighth Amendment cases; 217 this body of law is now
in the middle,' as state legislatures refuse 'to spend sufficient tax dollars to bring conditions in
outdated prisons up to minimally acceptable standards.'" (quotingJohnson v. Levine, 450 F.
Supp. 648, 654 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978))).
215. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (observing that whether intent is
implicit in "punishment" cannot depend on availability of fiscal constraint defense or other

"policy considerations").

216. Id. The Court also noted that, to its knowledge, no other prison officials have sought
to use the funding defense to avoid the holding of Estelle v. Gamble. Id.; see Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to inmate's
serious medical needs to violate Eighth Amendment).
217. See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1980) ("It is well established that inadequate funding will not excuse the perpetuation of unconstitutional conditions
of confinement .... (citations omitted)); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir.
1980) (disallowing funding problems as excuse for unconstitutional confinement conditions
caused by understaffing of prison), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Battle v. Anderson, 564
F.2d 388, 396 (10th Cir. 1977) (providing that lack of financing is not defense for failure to
provide minimum constitutional standards in Oklahoma's prisons); Williams v. Edwards, 547
F.2d 1206, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that neither lack of funds nor lack of authority
over funds will justify operating prison in unconstitutional manner); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d
1291, 1319 (5th Cir. 1974) (asserting that unconstitutional prison conditions have not been
excused by fund shortages and inability of federal district courts to compel appropriations by
state legislature). In one decision a district court, realizing the constraints on prison officials,
all but apologized for finding that prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment due to
problems aggravated by understaffing and an aging physical plant:
Given the most generous application ofjudicial restraint [the overcrowding] raise[s]
serious Eighth Amendment problems. In the context of the physical plant and the
limits on staffing this overcrowding constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. This Court reaches this conclusion with the
greatest reluctance but the facts compel the conclusion.
Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435, 527 (N.D. Ind. 198 1), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub
noma.
and quoted with approval in Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984). In one of the earliest decisions to find confinement conditions
unconstitutional, the court in Holt v. Sarver rejected the proposition that constraints on prison
officials should excuse poor prison conditions:
Let there be no mistake in the matter, the obligation of the Respondents to eliminate
the existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the Legislature may
do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, what Respondents may actually
be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is
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called into question. 2 18 The Court's mention of the fiscal constraint
defense is troubling because if the defense is deemed to be valid,
the impact of Wilson on prisoners across the country will be great.
Because adequate prison funding is consistently problematic, 2 19 it is
likely that the defense will be raised frequently and successfully.
Thus, the rights of prisoners not to live in squalor may be lost as a
220
result of the fiscal problems facing our nation's prisons.
In addition to funding constraints and the problems directly associated with them such as aging facilities and understaffing, 22 1 the
issue of whether rapid prison overcrowding will constitute a congoing to have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the United
States.
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
218. The Supreme Court's dicta in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 112 S. Ct. 748
(1992) would appear at first glance to resolve the funding issue. The Court stated, "Financial
constraints may not be used tojustify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional violations
...... Id at 764. This statement, however, merely begs the question. To have any meaning,
the statement first requires the existence of a constitutional violation. Under Wilson v. Seiter,
the constitutional violation does not exist unless prison officials act with "deliberate indifference." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (1991) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)). Thus, it is still unclear whether a legitimate funding constraint could preclude a finding of deliberate indifference and hence a constitutional violation. The Supreme
Court's dicta in Rufo would only become relevant in a case where a constitutional violation is
first established.
219. In recent years, prison funding problems have not necessarily stemmed from legislators' reluctance to allocate money for prison upkeep, improvements, and construction. The
problems have stemmed from the failure of funding to keep up with prison population
growth. See, e.g.,Jeffrey Hoff, PrisonOvercrowdingPoses Tough Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991,
§ 12NJ, at I (reporting that by end of 1991, state of NewJersey will have shortage of 7000
prison beds despite increase in Department of Corrections' budget from $92 million in 1980
to $599 million in 1991); Rick Pearson, State Building Prisons, But Not Fast Enough, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 17, 1990, at Cl (explaining that despite aggressive 14-year prison construction program
there are 24,869 inmates in Illinois state penitentiary system designed to hold 18,760); Todd
Spangler, Lawmakers Mull Prison Alternatives, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at B1, B3 (reporting
that unchecked growth in prison population and approximate cost of $20,000 per year to
support each inmate has forced Maryland state legislators to consider alternatives to $200
million plan for new prison); see also SHELDON KRANTZ & LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 502 (4th ed. 1991) (noting that State and
Federal Governments have rapidly increased prison and jail construction to provide space for
prisoners yet have failed to eliminate overcrowding). In the federal system, despite a $2.4
billion expansion budget for fiscal years 1989-1991, the Bureau of Prisons reported that its
facilities were operating at 60% over capacity as ofJanuary 1991. UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL PRISONS: REVISED DESIGN STANDARDS COULD SAVE EXPANSION
FUNDS 2 (Mar. 1991). Problems in prison funding are vividly illustrated by the growing
number of prisoners and the cost of their housing. For example, from 1980 to 1990 the total
number of prisoners in the United States increased by 441,422, an increase of 134%. PRISONERS IN 1990, supra note 1, at 1. The average cost of operating the federal prisons in the fiscal
year of 1990 was $17,909 per inmate. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FACTS ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS (1990). It is not surprising, therefore, that Justice Brennan commented, "The
problems of administering prisons within constitutional standards are indeed complex and
intractable, but at their core is a lack of resources allocated to prisons." Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 357 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
220. The political debate over prison funding is illuminated by the cases cited at supra
note 217.
221. See Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 958-59 (6th Cir. 1989) (relating poor conditions
to understaffing problem); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding
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straint on officials that may preclude a finding of wantonness also
arises. For instance, prison officials may argue that poor conditions
at a prison are not due to their deliberate indifference, but rather
are due to rapid overcrowding that is beyond their control. 22 2 As
with the insufficient funding defense, if this defense is successful,
the impact of Wilson on prisoners will be grave. Because prisons are
consistently overcrowded, 2 23 this defense could be raised frequently
and successfully and would exacerbate the difficulties prisoners experience in securing their constitutional rights.
No matter what the particular constraint on an official may be, the
required severity of the constraint is also open to interpretation.
The inquiry is therefore not limited to determining what kinds of
constraints preclude a finding of wantonness, but also includes what
level of encumbrance created by a constraint precludes a wantonness finding. 224 The courts must determine the proper threshold as
to whether the degree of restriction must be severe, serious, slightly
encumbering, or something else to vindicate the prison officials.
For instance, if a prison official argues she was not deliberately indifunnecessary suffering of inmates due to overtaxed physical and personnel resources), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984).
222. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), provides an illustration of how quickly a prison
can become overcrowded. The facility in Wolfish was a pre-trial custodial detention center
constructed in New York City in 1975. Id. at 524. The facility was designed to house 449
inmates, a 50% increase over the previous facility. Id. at 525. Yet before the facility opened,
the number of persons committed for pre-trial hearings rose at an "unprecedented" rate. Id
The unexpected flow of inmates caused the facility to rise above its planned capacity shortly
after opening, resulting in the replacement of single bunk cells with double bunks. Id. Within
four months of the facility's opening, detainees and sentenced prisoners filed a class action
suit challenging, inter alia, the overcrowded conditions of the facility, Id at 526. Also, consider Rhodes v. Chapman in which the prison opened for use in 1972 and by 1975 an increase in
the prison population forced officials to begin "double celling" the inmates. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 341 (1981); see also supra note 29 (discussing double ceiling issue in
Rhodes). The Court in Rhodes held that double celling is not a per se violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-49. Nonetheless, double celling often forms the basis
of Eighth Amendment claims brought by inmates challenging overcrowded conditions. See,
e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 428 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's determination that double celling violated Eighth Amendment); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 125153 (7th Cir. 1985) (summarizing living environment experienced by double-celled prisoners
and upholding district court's complete ban on double celling at prison where narrowly
cramped cells are feature of severely overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary conditions), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting
district court's conclusion that double celling "engendered violence, tension and psychiatric
problems," and concluding that conditions supported court's preliminary injunction prohibiting double ceiling at prison). Indeed, the petitioner in Wilson v. Seiter alleged overcrowded
conditions at the prison by noting the number of "double-bunked" cells. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 84, at 5 (observing that of 143 beds in prison, all but 28 were doublebunked).
223. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing problem of overcrowded
prisons).
224. Cf. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-22 (1986) (establishing level of prison official culpability required to violate Eighth Amendment as function of competing obligations
and interests of officials).
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ferent toward poor confinement conditions because the conditions
were caused by rapid overcrowding, then a court's inquiry turns to
how the overcrowding hindered the official. If the level of hindrance caused by the constraint reaches the required threshold,
then the prison official did not act wantonly and the Eighth Amend225
ment is not violated.
The level at which courts set this threshold, therefore, will significantly determine the impact of Wilson. A low threshold requiring
only a showing that the constraint reasonably encumbered the official would enable prison officials to successfully argue the defense
with relative ease. A high threshold, on the other hand, requiring a
showing that the constraint created no reasonable alternative for the
official would create a substantial barrier to successful pleading of
the defense. The latter construction, therefore, would significantly
diminish the impact on prisoners of Wilson's constraint defense. It
would lessen the possibility that a prison official could preclude an
Eighth Amendment violation by utilizing such a defense.
C. Interpretingthe Scope of "IdentifiableHuman Needs"

After rejecting the totality of circumstances test, the Court in Wilson held that some conditions could violate the Eighth Amendment
in combination when each would not do so alone, 226 but only if the
conditions have a mutually enforcing effect that deprives a prisoner
of at least a single identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise. 227 The idea that the conditions must deprive prisoners of
a single identifiable human need is not new, however. The "core
conditions" test and its variations are similar to the single identifiable human needs test and have been applied by a number of
courts. 228 As previously noted, the core conditions test and the single identifiable human needs test effectively achieve the same results
in their applications. 229
The impact of the Court's decision to reject the totality of circumstances test and replace it with the single identifiable human needs
225. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (stating that whether conduct can
be considered wanton depends upon constraints facing official and not on conduct's effect on
prisoners).
226. Id. at 2327 (dismissing petitioner's contention that each prison condition challenged
must be considered as part of overall prison conditions).
227. Id.; see supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing Court's rejection of
totality of circumstances test and articulation of alternative single identifiable human needs
test).
228. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (providing cases and discussing core
conditions test and its variations).
229. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (discussing similarities of tests).
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test is unclear for two reasons. First, considering that the latter test
is similar to the core conditions test, the impact of the decision may
be nominal. There is some contention that the outcomes of the core
conditions and totality of circumstances tests are generally consistent, because most cases involve core-area violations. 230 The core
conditions test, however, may only protect inmates against physical
and not psychological harm. 231 If this is so, the impact of Wilson will
be to restrict Eighth Amendment protection.
Second, the majority opinion in Wilson did not clearly indicate
which needs are "identifiable human need[s];" the opinion only proscribed conditions that deprive inmates of needs such as food,
warmth, or exercise. 23 2 Beyond these three, it is uncertain what ad-

ditional inmate needs, if any, are constitutionally required to be
met. 23 3 The possible range of needs and conditions depriving such

needs encompassed within the standard could vary considerably.
Previous decisions, for example, that rejected the totality of circumstances test have come up with substantially different conclusions as
to which specific conditions can create deprivations that violate the
Eighth Amendment. 234 Responsibility for defining the precise
230. See Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-19 (finding that despite its conservative language,
approach of core conditions test is generally consistent with outcomes reached after application of totality of conditions test).
231. Gottlieb points out that when a core condition is not met, the deprivation can produce physical pain for prisoners. Id at 2-19. He states, "Indeed, the core conditions that are
protected by the Eighth Amendment are those conditions generally encompassed in crueltyto-animal regulations." Id Gottlieb finds support for his notion that the Eighth Amendment
should protect against confinement conditions that cause acute psychological harm in Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 2-19. In Trop, the
Supreme Court struck down a law that denationalized soldiers who deserted from the armed
forces on Eighth Amendment grounds. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-104.
232. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991).
233. The Court may have provided some indication of which other deprived needs are
violative of the Eighth Amendment by citing several lower court decisions with approval. See
id. (commenting that courts in Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984), Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982), and
Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1981), understood that Rhodes v. Chapman
established broad proposition that overall conditions can violate Eighth Amendment); see also
infra note 234 (discussing courts' findings in Wellman, Hoptowit, and Wright).
234. In Wright and Hoptowit, the Ninth Circuit found the Eighth Amendment violated if
prison conditions deprived the inmate of adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical
care, and personal safety. Wright, 642 F.2d at 1132-33; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246; see supra
notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing core conditions test and Ninth Circuit decisions). In Wilson v. Seiter, the Sixth Circuit expanded this list, finding the following conditions
to violate the Eighth Amendment: denial of adequate access to shower facilities, denial of
medical treatment, overcrowding, threats to safety, vermin infestation, inadequate lighting,
inadequate ventilation, unsanitary eating conditions, and housing of inmates with known dangerous individuals. See Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 864-65 (6th Cir. 1990) (deriving list
from courts of appeals and Supreme Court precedent), vacatedon other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2321
(1991). The Sixth Circuit's list of relevant conditions overlaps with and clarifies several of the
Ninth Circuit's protected criteria. For example, vermin infestation fits into the broad category
of inadequate sanitation, and inadequate ventilation fits into the category of inadequate shelter. But the Sixth Circuit's list of relevant prison conditions is more than mere clarification;
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scope of Eighth Amendment protection in confinement conditions
cases has therefore been relegated to future courts. Obviously, the
longer the list of identifiable human needs and specified proscribed
conditions, the greater the protection afforded to prison inmates.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the current and projected prison population, the

number of jurisdictions with major prisons already under court order or consent decree to improve conditions, the prison overcrowding problem facing the nation, 235 and the political powerlessness of
prisoners, 236 the ambiguities and issues left to be resolved after Wilson v. Seiter should be construed so as not to further narrow the constitutional safeguards afforded prisoners. By doing this, courts
around the nation can prevent an already volatile situation from
worsening.
First, courts should attempt to avoid defining "deliberate indifference" as a high degree of tortious or criminal recklessness in the
context of prisoners' Eighth Amendment challenges to confinement
conditions. 23 7 Applying a standard of that type would require the
difficult and problematic task of examining the intent of prison officials who may or may not have been responsible for substandard
the list is expansive. For instance, overcrowding is a separate category. Wilson, 893 F.2d at
864; see also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (analyzing overcrowding
as separate violation of Eighth Amendment and upholding district court's decision that prison
was unconstitutionally overcrowded in light of factors such as understaffing, aging facilities,
and vermin infestation), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984). It is conceivable that under the
Ninth Circuit's standard, an overcrowded prison that provides adequate food, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety would not violate the Eighth Amendment. Likewise, a
prison having adequate shelter but failing to provide adequate access to showers would not be
in violation under the Ninth Circuit standard. The Sixth Circuit's formulation, therefore,
more fully protects prisoners. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit did not portray its listing of
violative conditions as exhaustive and instead purported only to be applying precedent. See
Wilson, 893 F.2d at 865 (analyzing applicable cases and applying precedent to facts in case).
More violative conditions could conceivably be developed.
235. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing and providing statistics on
present and future prison populations, overcrowded conditions, and jurisdictions under court
orders or consent decrees to correct overcrowded conditions).
236. Justice Brennan recognized the political problems of prisoners and discussed the
tensions between prisoners, prison officials, state legislatures, and the Constitution in his concurring opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 357-61 (1991) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that prisoners are" 'voteless, politically unpopular, and socially
threatening.'" Id at 358 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Morris, The Snail's Pace of Prison
Reform, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 100TH CONGRESS OF CORRECTION OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, 36, 42 (1970)). Furthermore, Justice Brennan asserted that problems in some
instances intensify due to the attitudes of politicians and officials, which "sad experience"
shows are sometimes insensitive to constitutional requirements. Id. at 358 n.7 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). But see id at 352 (warning that courts cannot presume in their oversight responsibility that legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to requirements of Constitution).
237. See supra notes 177-94 and accompanying text (discussing possible interpretations of
recklessness).
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confinement conditions that often develop over a period of time.2 38
Instead, courts should interpret deliberate indifference as: (1)
knowledge and a failure to act; (2) inexcusable lack of knowledge; or
(3) repeated negligent acts that disclose a pattern of prison official
conduct, or systematic and gross deficiencies in prison staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures. 2 9 These formulations require a
lesser showing of intent and could therefore be demonstrated more
easily by inmates seeking relief.240 The third formulation, repeated
negligent acts or systematic and gross deficiencies, is preferable to
the others because the second part of the formulation does not require a state-of-mind inquiry at all. 24 1 A court's inquiry into deliberate indifference under this formulation would therefore resemble an
objective analysis of the challenged conditions.
Second, lower courts should uphold the body of law that prohibits
prison officials from bringing a lack of funding defense to preclude a
finding of wantonness, 2 42 despite contradictory insinuations by the
Court in Wilson. 243 With the difficulties that legislatures face with
growing prison populations and the high cost of providing for prisoners, 24 4 a lack of funding defense, if allowed, would probably be
raised often and successfully. The deliberate indifference standard
would therefore become a substantial barrier to prisoners attempting to secure their constitutional rights in these circumstances.
Third, courts should refuse to ratify or endorse prison officials'
deliberate indifference to poor confinement conditions based solely
on grounds that a prison became rapidly overcrowded and the conditions were therefore beyond the control of the officials. As with
238. See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 422 (observing that when courts infer intent from
objective criteria, it is unclear whose state of mind is at issue and that more precise test for
attributing subjective responsibility should be developed); see also Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330
(White, J., concurring) (finding intent not meaningful when conditions of confinement can be
attributed to cumulative actions of numerous officials over period of time).
239. See supra notes 159-76, 195-202 and accompanying text (discussing possible interpretations of deliberate indifference standard and level of culpability required in each
interpretation).
240. See supra notes 167, 175-76, 198-99 and accompanying text (placing interpretations
of deliberate indifference on culpability continuum closer to negligence than intent).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99 (discussing systematic and gross deficiencies interpretation of deliberate indifference standard and recognizing objective propensities
of interpretation).
242. See supra note 217 (listing cases that have rejected lack of funding defense).
243. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (discussing Court's treatment of "cost
defense" in Wilson). The Court posited that it could not understand how fiscal constraints
could change the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment, thereby suggesting that the lack
of funding defense would be valid. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991). The Court
refrained from fully addressing the "cost defense" issue, however, because prison officials had
not raised such a defense. Id.
244. See supra note 219 (pointing out that because of prison growth and incarceration
costs, state legislatures are having difficulty funding prisons adequately).
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the .funding defense, an overcrowding defense could be raised often
and successfully, especially considering the current and projected
overcapacity operating rates of prisons in the United States. 245
Consequently, if this defense is sanctioned, prisoners living in overcrowded conditions could be left without an Eighth Amendment
remedy. If courts nevertheless choose to allow either the lack of
funding defense or the rapid overcrowding defense, it is recommended that the courts restrict these defenses if prison officials have
any feasible options available to alleviate either the funding or overcrowding problem. 246
Fourth, because conditions must deprive inmates of "a single,
identifiable need" to violate the Eighth Amendment, courts should
create an expansive list of such needs. Specifically, the list of needs
should at the very least include adequate food, clothing, shelter, exercise, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. 24 7 Moreover,
courts should fortify the rights predicated on these needs by creating a rebuttable presumption that certain conditions of confinement-such as overcrowding, inadequate access to shower facilities,
vermin infestation, inadequate lighting, inadequate ventilation, and
unsanitary eating conditions-specifically deprive inmates of identifiable needs. 248 With a comprehensive list of needs supplemented
by clearly identifiable violative conditions, prisoners would be able
to receive adequate Eighth Amendment protection with regard to
objective conditions of confinement.
Fifth, as a practical matter, prisoners and attorneys challenging
confinement conditions after Wilson should refocus their case preparation and arguments to meet both the subjective and objective
245. See PRISONERS IN 1990, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that prison population reached
771,243 and that prisons were operating between 18% to 29% over capacity at 1990 yearend). Despite a plan to expand the prison system the Federal Bureau of Prisons expects federal prisons to operate at 30% over capacity in 1995 due to increases in inmate population.
GAO, PRISON CROWDING, supra note 2, at 17.
246. Subsequent to Wilson v. Seiter, the Fifth Circuit adopted a similar analysis in Alberti v.
Sheriff of Harris County, 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991). The court in Alberti rejected prison
officials' argument that overcrowded conditions were beyond their control by noting that the
officials could have temporarily housed inmates in a military-style tent city until the problem
was corrected. Id at 999; see supra note 4 (identifying newspaper story reporting that Massachusetts governor was considering placing inmates on ship to relieve prison overcrowding).
247. This list combines the needs articulated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1978), with
those mentioned in Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). In Bell v. Wofish, the Court
quoted with approval the Second Circuit's statement that "[a]n institution's obligation under
the Eighth Amendment is at an end if it furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal sanitation." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 529
n.1 I (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978)). In Wilson, the Court named
food, warmth, and exercise as identifiable human needs. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
248. The Sixth Circuit in Wilson v. Seiter listed these conditions, among others, as violative
of the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861,864 (6th Cir. 1990), vacatedon other
grounds, II1 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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components of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment test. Most importantly, they should broaden their discovery to
target evidence and facts that indicate the state of mind of the
prison officials toward the deficient conditions. Considering the
current flexibility of the deliberate indifference standard, prisoner
plaintiffs should be prepared to prove a high level of prison official
culpability, one that is closely related to intent.
Finally, also as a practical matter, prisoners and their attorneys
should not let the objective conditions of confinement "speak for
themselves" in proving deprivation of identifiable human needs.
Rather, the plaintiffs should carefully demonstrate how harsh confinement conditions result in the deprivation of at least one of the
identifiable human needs. After Wilson, only facts of confinement
conditions framed in terms of deprived needs will constitute a suc24 9
cessful Eighth Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION

In Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court handed down a two-part test
to determine whether prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment. First, the conditions must deprive the prisoner of a single
identifiable human need. 250 Second, prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to the conditions that deprive the prisoner of that
need. 251 This two-part test restricts the constitutional rights of prisoners to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by qualifying
the traditional objective component of Eighth Amendment analysis
and by adding a subjective component. The impact of the test on
prisoners' rights, however, remains to be developed by the lower
courts and will depend on how those courts define deliberate indifference, the defenses available to prison officials, and the identifiable human needs that must be deprived to trigger constitutional
protection. With the complex problems facing our nation's prisons,
the courts should construe the ambiguities of Wilson v. Seiter in favor
of prisoners' constitutional rights.

249. See Wilson v. Seiter, I11 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991) ("Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 84, at 36)).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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